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The primary goal of this research is to investigate whether the length and 
frequency of deployments affect the likelihood of divorce. The study uses data 
from the Contingency Tracking System (CTS) and the Active Duty Military 
Personnel file. The sample includes all active duty Navy and Marine Corps 
members from 2000 to 2009. Three models of divorce are estimated, each with a 
different control for the stress of deployment on the family: length of deployment, 
number of deployments, and a combination of both. The results suggest that in 
the general active duty population, the frequency of deployments instead of the 
length of deployments induces the greatest level of marital conflict.   
In addition to investigating the divorce effects for the entire population of 
Navy and Marine Corps personnel, the study also focuses attention on a selected 
sample of individuals with complete marital and deployment histories—this group 
tends to be younger and at the early stage of marriage.  For this group, the 
number of days deployed was a positive and significant predictor of divorce rates 
for both Navy and Marine Corps enlistees. Additionally, the study shows that the 
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The welfare of the military family has a direct effect on the military 
member’s ability to perform his or her job. Presidential Study Directive 9 is 
dedicated to improving the life of the military family. President Obama stated, 
“With millions of military spouses, parents and children sacrificing, ... the 
readiness of our Armed Forces depends on the readiness of military families” 
(Swift, 2011). The statement acknowledges that when military families are 
supported, the military member can focus a greater amount of his or her efforts 
on military tasks. The United States depends on military members collectively to 
ensure the country’s national security. Over 50% of the military is married, and 
thus, the well-being of the military family greatly affects the level of the national 
security provided by the military (DoD, 2008). According to a January 24, 2011, 
White House press release , the initiative is not only intended to strengthen the 
military family, but it is also intended to “help ensure the U.S. military recruits and 
retains America’s best” (The White House, 2011). 
Funding for programs that support military families is part of defense 
spending. The defense budget is part of the nation’s discretionary spending, 
which has recently been under constant scrutiny for budget cuts. Of the four main 
congressional categories of defense spending—(1) military personnel; (2) 
operations and maintenance; (3) procurement; and (4) research, development, 
testing, and evaluation (RDT&E)—the category of military personnel is 
consistently the second most expensive. Military personnel salaries and bonuses 
are two of the major outlays from the military personnel account, which also pays 
for a recruit’s housing and travel to training (Jones & McCaffery, 2008). Recruits 
frequently receive bonuses for enlisting, in addition to receiving a salary during 
basic training. The investment in a military recruit can be considered as the 
recruit’s salary, enlistment bonus, travel to training, recruit housing, and basic 
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the recruit’s contribution to military productivity (national security), is negative. 
The longer a recruit stays in the military, the greater his or her contribution to 
national security, and therefore, a recruit’s ROI becomes increasingly positive. 
Since retention decisions are often influenced by family considerations, 
improving the well-being of military families can increase the time that the recruit 
remains in the military, thus increasing the ROI on the initial costs of recruiting 
and training. Attracting the most qualified applicants for military service and 
retaining them beyond their first term would more efficiently utilize funding 
provided in the military personnel account.  
As the American working-class demographic changes from baby boomers 
to Generation X and Generation Y, it is important to consider what each worker 
values. Metlife’s eighth annual survey of employee benefits (Metlife, 2010) found 
that baby boomers, Generation X, and Generation Y employees felt that work-life 
programs contributed to 53%, 61%, and 68%, respectively, of the loyalty they felt 
toward their employer (Metlife, 2010).  
The research presented in this thesis is intended to increase 
understanding of specific military work-family cohesion factors. Knowing key 
triggers that precipitate a change in a member’s marital status will allow for the 
tailoring of future personnel policy by the respective Services. Successful 
personnel policies will increase the attractiveness of the military as a career field 
and, therefore, increase retention and fiscal responsibility by increasing the ROI 
of recruits, family welfare programs, and the bonuses required to attract qualified 
applicants.   
B. BACKGROUND 
According to the Population Representation in the Military Services Fiscal 
Year 2008 Report (DoD, 2008), 52.23% of all active enlisted members, 68.62% 
of active Navy officers, and 65.55% of active Marine Corps officers are married. 
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made the decision to marry. Marrying increases the number of significant 
demands on a member’s time by nearly 100%.  
Prior to the decision to marry, an adult is primarily held accountable for the 
completion of work requirements. Consider the case of a person who has moved 
out of his or her parent’s house. A person living on his or her own is responsible 
for providing for his or her own food and shelter, which is facilitated by a job. By 
meeting the required responsibilities of a job, an individual can meet these two 
basic human needs, making the fulfillment of a job’s requirements a high priority 
for the worker. The decision to marry increases the prominence of family 
commitments, putting family commitments potentially in conflict with work 
commitments. The amount of time in a day does not increase after marriage; 
however, a married person is expected to meet both work and family 
requirements.  
Many factors play a part in the successful fulfillment of both roles; 
understanding an employer’s requirements and, separately, a spouse’s 
requirements, and the alignment and conflicts of both, helps ease the strain 
between work and family roles. Military deployments increase the time a member 
spends at work and, therefore, decreases the time a member spends with his or 
her family, as well as his or her ability to perform family requirements. The 
military attempts to lessen the work-family conflict surrounding deployment by 
providing the member with time prior to and after deployment in which the 
member is not required to fulfill his or her everyday work role. Is there a point at 
which no amount of time off from work can compensate for the demands of 
frequent deployments? 
Since 2003, the United States has been engaged in two conflicts: 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) in Iraq. Both operations have required a large manpower component. From 
2001 to the present, the largest end strength of Navy personnel was in 2002, with 
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personnel has steadily decreased since 2002, culminating in an end strength of 
324,000 in 2010 (DoD, 2010).  
Figure 1 depicts the end strength of all active duty members for each 
Service by fiscal year (FY). The steady decline of the Navy’s end strength and 
the relatively constant end strength of the Marine Corps are graphically displayed. 
The increased Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), due to the concurrence of OIF 
and OEF and the decrease in personnel, increases each  military member’s 
individual burden. The likelihood of deploying one or more times, or for longer 
periods of time, is higher with every reduction in end strength.     
 
 
Figure 1.   Active Duty End Strength, FY1999–FY2010 
 (DoD, 2010) 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary goal of this research is to analyze the effect of deployment on 
a member’s probability of divorce. More specifically, the focus of this research is 
to determine if a change in a member’s status from married to divorced is 
preceded by different deployment characteristics than those of a member who 
stays married. Variables representing deployment locations, deployment length, 
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demographic information—such as age at the time of marriage, gender, race, 
religion, spouse’s military status, occupations, and cohort year—were also 
included in the models to control for additional factors that may influence marital 
conflict.  
The secondary aim of this research is to estimate the cost of divorce to the 
military. To capture the impact of divorce on the military, a model is developed 
that accounts for the number of days of work lost due to divorce. Results from the 
model are represented in days per year, percentage of worker productivity, and 
monetary compensation. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is divided into three main sections. The first section includes a 
review of relevant literature and theories about the factors that increase the 
likelihood of marriage and divorce. The concept of role conflict (conflict between 
job and family) serves as the framework for the analysis of increased marital 
conflict due to deployment, which is a precursor to divorce. This section also 
discusses role conflict within the military structure.  
The second section, consisting of Chapters III–V, presents deployment 
and demographic data furnished by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 
to quantitatively analyze the effect of deployment in support of OEF or OIF on a 
member’s marital status.1 The data included all active duty officers and enlistees 
in the Navy and Marine Corps. The multivariate analysis was conducted 
separately for Navy officers, Navy enlistees, Marine Corps officers, and Marine 
Corps enlistees.  
The third section (Chapters VI and VII) presents the results from the 
multivariate analysis to estimate the opportunity and monetary costs of divorce to 
the military. A summary of findings and conclusions ensues. 
                                            
1 The information provided by DMDC is not available to the public due to the Privacy Act Of 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
Divorce is the result of irreconcilable conflict between spouses. Hogan and 
Seifert (2009) showed that military members have a greater incentive to marry 
than their civilian counterparts. The military incentive in turn, may have greater 
incidence of future marital conflict. Conflict between spouses is a manifestation of 
the inability to comply or adjust to the expectations of one’s significant other. The 
role of a spouse in a marriage is defined by such expectations.  
A married military member fills at least two roles, soldier and spouse, and 
the demands of those roles may conflict. An increasingly prevalent form of role 
conflict is the interference of work with family, or work-family conflict. Kahn, Wolfe, 
Quinn, Snoek, and Rosenthal (1964) defined role conflict as a “simultaneous 
occurrence of two (or more) sets of pressures such that compliance with one 
would make more difficult compliance with the other” (p. 19). Advances in 
technology such as e-mail, cell phones, laptops, and smart phones have 
increased the ability of work-related tasks to interfere with a worker’s home life 
and vice-versa (Major, Fletcher, Davis, & Germano, 2008). Increased 
connectivity when workers are at home decreases the amount of time available 
for the family. Military members are subject to the same encroachment of work 
on family time due to technology as civilians. Since 2003, Operational Tempo 
(OPTEMPO) has increased for military members, requiring additional time to be 
spent at work preparing for deployments, supporting deployments, or on 
deployment.  
Members of the military are more likely to marry than their civilian 
counterparts because of additional incentives such as living off-base, increased 
take-home pay, and spousal benefits. Considering the recent increase in the time 
the military demands of its members, it is reasonable to expect members of the 
military to have a higher rate of marriage and a higher rate of marital conflict than 
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physical and mental health. A Service member’s health directly impacts his or her 
ability to perform assigned tasks, as well as his or her choice to continue with 
military service. Due to the connection between a Service member’s quality of life 
and his or her ensuing personal and professional choices, it is critical to 
understand what consequences an increased OPTEMPO may have in the 
current and future interconnected environments of work and family.   
In this chapter, the theoretical basis for work interference with family will 
be reviewed, as well as the military factors that incentivize marriage. Furthermore, 
studies that incorporate time spent at work as a factor that represents work 
interference with family will be reviewed. The article “Work/Family Fit as a 
Mediator of Work Factors on Marital Tension: Evidence from the Interface of 
Greedy Institutions” (Pittman, 1994) and the study Families Under Stress: An 
Assessment of Data, Theory, and Research on Marriage and Divorce in the 
Military (Karney & Crown, 2007) form the basis and justification for further 
exploration of increased work interference with family as it relates to marital 
distress. 
B. BACKGROUND ON WORK INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY 
Work interference with family and family interference with work are two 
related role conflicts; the word preceding interference signifies what aspect of life 
the conflict is coming from, and the word after signifies what part of life the 
conflict is interfering with.(Forthofer, Markman, Cox, Stanley, & Kessler, 1996).  
A work-interference-with-family conflict is one in which an aspect of work 
is interfering with family life. The work environment is such that the hours a 
person spends at work are increasing along with his or her connectivity to work 
through e-mail or a personal digital assistant (PDA) device (Major et al., 2008. 
These factors increase the possibility of work-interference-with-family. Studies 
suggest that work-interference-with-family is more common than family-
interference-with-work (Major et al., 2008. However, experiencing conflict from 
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with-family and family-interference-with-work. In the military, the advent of 
technology is increasing the military’s interference with the family life of its 
members, similar to the way technology is affecting work interference with family 
in the civilian sector.    
To understand the basic way that one role can interfere with another role, 
Carlson, Derr, and Wadsworth (2003) broke the conflict into three categories: 
time-based, strain-based, and behavior-based conflict. Time-based conflict 
occurs because time spent in one role limits the time that can be spent in another 
(Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985). A greater number of hours spent at work or on 
deployment limits the time available to spend with family. It also limits the ability 
of a nondeployed spouse to be employed, or if he or she is employed, it limits the 
time available to spend with the couple’s children. The military’s engagement in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq without increasing its force requires members to spend 
more time deployed.  
Each role comes with a set of requirements. Work requirements are 
predominately defined by the employer, whereas family requirements are 
predominately defined by a spouse or by the military member. Regardless of the 
defined requirements, which will vary by person, when the requirements of one 
role impede the accomplishment of the requirements of the other role, the result 
is strain-based conflict (Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985). Strain-based conflict could 
arise out of low spouse support, which would be an example of family-
interference-with-work.  
In the final category, behavior-based conflict occurs when the behavior 
expected in one role makes it difficult to behave the expected way in the other 
role (Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985). The Army conducted a study showing an 
increase in moderate and severe physical aggression from military members 
returning from deployment; because aggressive behavior is not desirable in 
marriage, this creates behavioral conflict between spouses (McCarroll, 2000). 
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(PTSD) often find it difficult to behave with the same level of intimacy that their 
spouse desires, which can also be a source of behavioral conflict.   
When workers are not able to balance their work and family roles, they 
have a greater risk of suffering from increased levels of stress and stress-related 
illness, lower life satisfaction, higher rates of family strife, violence, divorce, and 
substance abuse (Hobson, Delunas, & Kesic, 2001). Workers experiencing 
stressful levels of role conflict can manifest this stress in the following ways: 
higher rates of absenteeism and turnover, reduced productivity, decreased job 
satisfaction, lower levels of organizational commitment and loyalty, and rising 
healthcare costs (Hobson et al., 2001; Rodgers & Rodgers, 1989).   
A consequence of work-interference-with-family is divorce. Although there 
is no single formula or predictor to explain why couples divorce, what is known is 
that stress increases when a spouse is unable to meet family needs. Prolonged 
stress has been linked to frustration, which can be linked to conflict, and conflict 
that cannot be resolved is linked to divorce (Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, 2006). 
Holding all other factors constant, Bramlett and Mosher showed in a 2002 study 
the following two characteristics that increase the probability of a divorce: the 
younger a person is at the time of marriage and the lower the level of education 
upon entering into the marriage (Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, 2006).  
Based on the definition of role conflict provided by Kahn et al. (1964) and 
on the changing dynamics of both work and family life, it is reasonable to expect 
a higher instance of work-family conflict in the military than in the civilian 
population. Because marriages fail when the conflict exceeds acceptable levels 
for one or both of the spouses, it is logical to conclude that excessive work-
interference-with-family could be a causal factor for divorce.  
C. MILITARY MARRIAGE INCENTIVE 
The military incentivizes marriage. Consider the traditional military 
marriage, in which a member of the military marries a civilian. Upon registering 
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increases, and, as a junior enlistee, he or she is then given the option to live off-
base or in family housing. How much the BAH increases depends on the prior 
situation of the member. If the member is an E-3, junior enlisted, living on-base, 
his or her monthly BAH pay will increase by $626.40 per month (DoD, 2009). 
Stated another way, an E-3 living on base receives a 32% pay increase just for 
getting married. For military members who are already living off-base, the BAH 
pay only increases by $158.40 per month, which equates to a 6.5% pay incentive 
(DoD, 2009). Moreover, after the marriage, the couple has the ability to live in 
base family housing and the spouse can shop tax-free at the Exchange and 
Commissary. For members of the military getting ready to deploy, an additional 
incentive to marry is so that the spouse can have access to all of the benefits if 
something should happen to the member on deployment. Also, when a military 
member is separated from his or her family, he or she receives a separation 
allowance of $250 per month, as long as the couple was co-located prior to 
deployment.  
Active duty members in their early 20s are more likely to be married than 
their civilian counterparts (Hogan & Seifert, 2009). While this could be due to the 
direct marriage premium built into the military compensation scheme, it could 
also be that members of the military may have stronger preferences to marry. 
Since people self-select into the military, it is likely that they differ from the civilian 
population in their unobserved preferences toward marriage. A comparison 
between the civilian sample and military service that does not provide marriage 
incentives (e.g., the National Guard) found no significant difference in the 
likelihood of marriage between the two groups (Hogan & Seifert, 2009). The 
average age of an E-3 is 18-22. The 18–22-year-old active duty military age 
group has the largest marriage incentive, as shown in the example of an E-3 who 
is living on base. Hogan and Seifert (2009) found that military members in their 
early 20s were three times as likely to marry than their civilian counterparts. The 
age group that has the greatest incentive to marry in the military is also at the 
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have a 29% greater chance of ending in divorce (Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, 
2006).    
Positive predictors of divorce are not limited to age. People with lower 
levels of education and with criminal records are also at a higher risk for divorce 
(Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, 2006). The selection process imposed by the 
military mitigates the highest of these risk factors by requiring minimum levels of 
education and waivers for criminal activity. That being said, the majority of the 
military members are young at the time of marriage and, if enlisted, generally 
have less than a college level of education. An additional factor that accounts for 
the type of stress that comes with a military job should be considered: Ruger, 
Wilson, and Waddoups (as cited in, Karney & Crown, 2007) conducted a study in 
2002 and found that experience in military combat from 1930–1984 increased the 
risk of subsequent marital dissolution by 62%.   
D. WORK INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY AND MARITAL TENSION 
Marital tension is difficult to study empirically because in the absence of 
divorce, there is no universal indication of marital tension. Studies have looked at 
martial tension by conducting personal interviews with spouses or by using 
previously collected data such as the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS). 
Divorce, a product of marital tension, could be a proxy for measuring if a 
marriage experienced tension, but divorce would not capture all the marriages 
experiencing tension.   
As sighted in Pittman’s work (1994) several studies have found conflicting 
evidence on the effect of work hours on marital stress: some indicating that more 
work hours increase marital stress, some indicating that more work hours reduce 
stress, and some finding no relationship between the two. Pittman (1994) 
surveyed 407 U.S. Army males and their wives to determine the effect of work 
hours on marital tension. He postulated the following:  
The most abstract and proximate mediator of the effects of work 
factors on marital qualities is the perception of fit between these 
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the spheres of work and family “fit,” it can be assumed that the 
demands of the two roles are relatively consistent with each other, 
which would minimize the experience of strain or that the demands 
of each are offset by the benefits acquired. (p. 185)  
To test the above hypothesis, Pittman (1994) used two “greedy institutions” (p. 
186): the family and the military. Pittman deemed both the family and the military 
to be greedy because of the demands each institution requires of their members. 
Pittman (1994) used the 407 survey responses in his study to create eight factors 
of spousal perceptions, four male and four female. In addition to these variables, 
he also included the husband’s work hours, the wife’s occupational status, and 
the socioeconomic status of the couple.  
 The survey used three questions to measure the military member’s 
spouse’s “satisfaction with husband’s regular work hours, satisfaction with his 
time in the field, and satisfaction with the time required for temporary duty 
assignments” (Pittman, 1994, p. 190). It is pertinent to note that the majority of 
the 407 surveys that were returned were from wives who were in their 30s, were 
married an average of 8.2 years, were in their first marriage, had children, and 
were White. Statistically, some factors that put a marriage in a high-risk category 
for divorce are marrying prior to the age of 26, having less than a bachelor’s 
degree, and being African American (Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, 2006). These 
statistics are mentioned to underscore the possible self-induced bias Pittman’s 
survey may have captured.  
Within the Pittman (1994) survey, the factor for the wife’s satisfaction with 
the time a military member spends at work was lower than that of the husband’s: 
8.95 and 9.92 on a scale of 3 to 15, respectively. The scores indicate that in this 
sample, both the husband and the wife were moderately satisfied with the 
amount of time the military member spent at work (Pittman, 1994). Spouses who 
found the military to fit and/or further their family goals had an overall higher 
satisfaction rating when asked how they felt about the amount of time their 
Service member spent at work. The variable used to capture the husband’s time 
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the number of hours the husband worked in a normal week, and Pittman (1994) 
used the average of these two estimates in the model.  
The LISREL 7 method of analysis shows an increase in the military 
member’s work hours to be consistent with a decrease in the spouse’s 
satisfaction with the member’s time spent at work. This could suggests that for 
families, there is a point at which the time required by the military surpasses the 
benefits of having a member of the family in the military—decreasing a spouse’s 
satisfaction with the member’s time spent at work. The question in the case of 
the global war on terror (GWOT) is as follows: as the time required of the military 
member increases, are military families able to endure the time, strain, and 
behavioral conflict exacerbated by separation?  
E. METHODS OF OPTEMPO’S MEASUREMENT AND FINDINGS 
There are several studies that examined the effect of a military member’s 
time commitment on different aspects of his or her life during different conflicts. 
Typical areas of study were a member’s retention, family conflict, and mental 
health. Each study used a variable that attempted to measure the time 
commitment required in excess of normal working hours. In the case of the 
military, this is most pronounced during deployments. Prior to 2001, most studies 
that examined deployment used military pay files to determine if a member was 
deployed. The studies prior to 2001 defined deployment based on a variable 
indicating hostile fire specialty pay, family separation pay, or some combination 
of the two.  
As of 2001, the military started maintaining the Contingency Tracking 
System (CTS) database, which houses all of the information about a member’s 
deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The advent of the CTS database allowed researchers to 
look at deployments in support of the GWOT with a greater level of precision; 
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GWOT. The next section discusses Karney and Crown’s 2007 study, which used 
the CTS database.  
1. Families Under Stress: An Assessment of Data, Theory and 
Research on Marriage and Divorce in the Military 
In 2007, RAND (Karney & Crown, 2007) published a study titled Families 
Under Stress: An Assessment of Data, Theory, and Research on Marriage and 
Divorce in the Military. The study considered previous research and data from 
FY1996 to the last quarter of FY2005 for all Services, active and reserve (Karney 
& Crown, 2007). Data analysis focused on whether the military divorce rate was 
different from the national divorce rate and on whether the divorce rates were 
rising as the demands for the military increased (OPTEMPO).  
According to the RAND study (Karney & Crown, 2007), the military does 
not seem to be suffering from a higher than normal divorce rate. In an analysis of 
the divorce rate in the military, RAND found that from FY2001–FY2005 in all 
Services but the Navy, the divorce rate had a positive trend, meaning the divorce 
rate was decreasing. RAND defined the divorce rate as number of divorces over 
total married members for a FY. The divorce rate in the Navy spiked after 
FY2001 but had decreased by FY2005 (Karney & Crown, 2007). As of FY2005, 
RAND assessed that the divorce rate in the military was at an approximate norm 
for the military because it was similar to the divorce rate in the military in FY1996. 
Thus, by FY2005, it appeared as though the increased OPTEMPO from the 
GWOT did not impact the divorce rate. RAND’s aggregate analysis of the divorce 
rate may have allowed the nondeployed members to compensate for the 
deployed members; therefore, a more in-depth analysis was conducted in this 
thesis. 
In its 2007 study, RAND used a survival analysis technique to gain a more 
in-depth examination of the cost of OPTEMPO on military families. To account 
for the direct impact of deployment on military members, RAND used longitudinal 
data for members whose entrance into marriage could be observed within the 
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demographic variables were included to account for other factors that influence 
marital stability: gender, age at marriage, race, and children. The number of days 
deployed and the square of the number of days deployed were jointly used to 
account for the length of deployment (Karney & Crown, 2007, p. 149).  
The study found that on average, active military members who were 
female and younger at the time of marriage increased the chances the marriage 
would end in divorce. Families that did not have children were also at a higher 
risk for divorce. Results indicating that children reduced the risk of divorce, the 
reduction in likelihood of divorce was more pronounced in the enlistee models. 
Blacks had a higher probability of divorce compared to Whites. The military race 
variable had a smaller magnitude but the same sign as civilian population studies 
(Karney & Crown, 2007). Controlling for demographic characteristics, the study 
found that the deployment variable was significant for all active duty members 
except Army officers. However, the study found the deployment effect to be 
negative for active duty Navy and Marine Corps officers and enlistees and Army 
enlistees. The study found that Air Force officers and enlistees were the only 
categories where the deployment variable was positive and significant, thus 
increasing the probability of divorce.   
RAND remarked that the findings in this study ran counter to the 
expectation that increased deployments would increase the divorce rate. Role 
conflict and the potential impacts of increased work time requirements (discussed 
earlier in the chapter) are compelling arguments that suggest a negative effect of 
increased OPTEMPO on marriage.  
It must be noted, however, that this study is the most comprehensive in 
this area. Prior studies of marital conflict in the military were based on data 
obtained from surveys and focus groups, which may have been un-
representative of the entire population of military personnel. One concern with 
the RAND study is that the data stopped in 2005. It may be the case that, since 
2005, the same military members have deployed again, putting an additional 
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families, this additional strain may outweigh the benefits of staying married. In 
this thesis, a longer time period was used to observe the effect of deployments 
on divorce, as well as controls for multiple deployments (a characteristic that was 
missing in the RAND study).   
F. CONCLUSION 
To date, only the 2007 RAND study has examined the increased demands the 
GWOT has put on the military and its subsequent effect on a member’s marital 
status. RAND assessed the likelihood of divorce for military members based on 
the length of time a member was deployed; however, the study only covered the 
time period from 2001–2005 (Karney & Crown, 2007). The following chapters 
looking at a military member’s likelihood of divorce, extending the time period of 
the previous RAND study to encompass deployments using data up to 
September 2009 for the Navy and Marine Corps. The extension of the data 
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III. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided all the data in this 
study from two main databases. The following chapter discusses each database 
and the study’s limitations. Section A covers the data sources, and Section B 
discusses the limitations of the data.    
A. DATA SOURCES 
Upon request, the DMDC extracted and provided deployment and 
demographic information for each member of the Navy and Marine Corps from 
the Contingency Tracking System (CTS) and the Active Duty Military Personnel 
File, for all active duty members from 2000 to 2009.  
1. Contingency Tracking System   
The Contingency Tracking System (CTS) provides deployment information 
on all members who deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Each entry in the CTS represents one 
unique deployment per member, so a Service member who was deployed 
multiple times would have multiple entries in the CTS. The first entry of the CTS 
data pull is September 11, 2001, and, for the purposes of this study, the last 
entry is July 1, 2010, when the extraction of the CTS portion of the data was 
completed by DMDC. A unique scrambled ID (EDIPN) identifies each Service 
member. There are a total of 2,650,593 unique entries in the CTS, which 
includes both active and reserve officers and enlisted members in the U.S. Navy 
and Marine Corps. The entries are associated with 589,850 unique Service 
members.  
2. Demographic File  
With the help of the DMDC, the demographic information for this study 
was drawn from the Active Duty Military Personnel File, the Active Duty Military 
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demographic data contains an entry for each member (as identified by their 
unique EDIPN) per quarter. All active duty Navy and Marine Corps personnel are 
included in the data. The inclusion of all available members provides Navy and 
Marine Corps population data instead of the Navy and Marine Corps sample data. 
Demographic variables included in the data are as follows: branch of Service, 
gender, birth date, race, faith, marital status, number of dependents, education 
level, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score, pay grade, rate or military 
occupational specialty (MOS), and Service of spouse. The DMDC provided a 
snapshot of the members’ information quarterly from October 31, 2000–
September 30, 2009.  
B. DATA RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The goal of this thesis is to look at how the OPTEMPO of the Navy and 
the Marine Corps has affected the members’ marital statuses by contributing to 
the conflict between work and family roles to such an extent that divorce results. 
Although the data provided essential information to conduct the analysis, there 
are several data limitations to keep in mind.  
First, although the CTS is the only data source at this time that tracks 
deployments, its data does not capture all deployments; instead, it only tracks 
deployments that are in support of OIF and OEF. In addition, even though a 20-
30% of the Navy and Marine Corps members are deploying in support of OIF and 
OEF, there are non- OIF and OEF deployments that the CTS does not capture. 
For example, deployments to the Pacific are not be accounted for in the CTS 
database.  
The CTS data is a good alternative to prior methods of deployment 
tracking. Previous studies that included members’ deployment time as a factor 
used members’ pay files to determine if members were deployed (Pilgrim, 2008). 
By looking at when a member receives special pay, it can be determined if the 
member is on deployment. The special pays used to determine if a member is 
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Danger Pay (HFP/IDP). Using pay data to determine a member’s deployment 
status accounts only for members who are on deployment or are on 
unaccompanied orders for 30 or more days and who have a dependent, or for 
members who are on orders or deployed to a hostile fire or imminent danger area.  
FSA is only applicable for members who live predominately with their 
spouse; if a spouse lives in a separate city (as a geographic bachelor), the 
Service member will not receive this pay. The expectation of deploying shortly 
after transferring to a new command is frequently reason enough to keep a 
member’s family at the previous duty station till after deployment. When FSA was 
used members that are geographic bachelors are excluded from the analysis. 
Many deployments, such as deployments to Germany, do not receive HFP/IDP. 
In the Navy, members embarked on ships do not receive HFP/IDP till crossing a 
specific latitude and longitude. Members not receiving HFP/IDP while deployed 
or only receiving it part of the time are excluded from the analysis. Both the CTS 
and the pay method for determining deployments are lacking. By using the CTS 
data, it is possible to assess the total effects of OIF and OEF, which includes 
geographic bachelors, and members who may be deployed to locations other 
than hostile or imminent-danger areas.   
Second, the record of marital status from DMDC is subject to recording 
error. To determine a change in the marital status of a Service member, this 
thesis relied on the information provided in the demographic file regarding 
members’ change in marital status, or lack thereof, from quarter to quarter. The 
off-the-shelf data that the DMDC compiled is only as good as the information that 
was initially put into each database. In some limited cases, entries are miscoded 
or simply missing. Furthermore, because the data is quarterly, if a member 
married and then divorced and remarried within the span of the quarter, it would 
look as if the member was married the entire time. This scenario is probably very 
unlikely, and so the measurement error is negligible. In the demographic file 
there were missing values for some individuals. For this analysis, the members 
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C. UNRESTRICTED AND RESTRICTED SAMPLE DEFINITION AND 
JUSTIFICATION 
Merging the CTS and demographic data created what this thesis will refer 
to as the unrestricted data set. The unrestricted data set included only married 
members, since married members are the ones at risk of divorce. The created 
data set represented a cross section of all active duty members during 2000–
2009, regardless of when they joined the Service or when they married. As a 
result, the unrestricted data set did not contain information on the member’s age 
at the time of marriage, length of marriage, and years of marriage. Since these 
variables are strong predictors of divorce, the analysis also identified a 
subsample (hereafter referred to as the restricted sample) including all married 
members whose entire deployment and marriage history can be observed. This 
included enlistees who entered and completed four years of service during 2000–
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IV. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This chapter expounds on Chapter III by defining each variable included in 
the quantitative models and by presenting descriptive statistics of the data. The 
dependent variable is defined in Section A, followed by the independent variables 
in Section B. Section C discusses the descriptive statistics.    
A. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
1. Marital Status Outcomes 
The dependent variable for this study was a military member’s divorce 
status, which will be referred to as divorced in the following discussion. Divorced 
is a binary variable that in this study was assigned a value of 1 if the member 
was divorced and 0 if the member’s status was other than divorced. The divorced 
variable was taken from the quarterly demographic entry created for the marital 
status of each member. Marital status had the following possible values: annulled, 
divorced, interlocutory, legally separated, married, never married, widowed, and 
missing. An individual is considered to be divorced if the marital status is any of 
the following four categories: annulled, divorced, interlocutory, or legally 
separated.  
A marriage that is going through an annulment, divorce, interlocutory, or 
legal separation indicates significant conflict. To analyze the effect of 
deployments on marital conflict, this study combined all four categories into one 
variable that represented overall marital conflict leading to marital dissolution. 
Karney and Crown (2007) also used the same definition for their marital 
dissolution variable. To eliminate as many missing marital status values as 
possible, the following steps were taken in the order listed: 
1. If marital status was missing for the current quarter but not missing 
for the previous quarter, the current quarter’s missing value was 
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2. If marital status was missing for the current quarter but not missing 
for the subsequent quarter, the current quarter’s missing value was 
replaced with the subsequent quarter’s value. 
3. If the first known marital status was never married but there were 
missing marital status values prior to the first known marital status, 
all prior missing marital status values were replaced with never 
married. 
The marital status variable also had a number of erroneous entries. Many 
of the errors originated after a member’s marital status changed from married to 
legally separated. The marital status directly following the coding of legally 
separated was generally coded as never married. To eliminate erroneous coding 
of never married, if a member was previously married, all never married marital 
status values were change to divorced.   
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The independent variables in this study consisted of demographic data 
and OIF and OEF deployment data. Demographic information includes gender, 
race, rank, occupation, religion, number of dependents, and spouse’s military 
status. The demographic variables, a subset of the independent variables, were 
included to control for factors other than work-family conflict that contribute to 
marital conflict. Deployment information representing a member’s length of 
deployment, location of deployment, and number of deployments were included 
to capture the part of marital conflict that results from work-family conflict, the 
element of interest in this study. 
1. Deployments While Married 
In this study, deployment information from the CTS database was 
recorded as one entry per deployment in support of OIF or OEF. This database 
allows any deployment made in support of OIF or OEF to be recorded, no matter 
the length of the deployment. Some Service members of the sample went on 
more than 10 deployments in a nine-year time span. It was crucial to have 
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was deployed while married. Simply using the variable number or length of 
deployments would not have captured all the different stresses to which a military 
family is exposed.   
Stress was introduced in two ways where deployments were concerned: 
the overall length of the deployment, and the departure and return of a member 
to the family. The unique characteristics of each deployment phase typically 
determine the most likely type of conflict experienced. The length of time a 
member is away dictates the number of previously shared responsibilities the 
spouse is now solely responsible for—with each additional responsibility, time-
based conflicts increase. Prior to deployment, a member and his or her family are 
at the greatest risk of strain-based conflict. The member is required to complete 
specific tasks that are critical to the unit’s success, and at the same time, he or 
she is attempting to get the greatest amount of quality time with his or her family 
prior to deploying, creating strain. Post deployment, the member and his or her 
spouse is at the greatest risk of behavior-based conflict. During deployment, the 
Service member experiences a shift in specific role responsibilities and 
expectations; therefore, once the deployment has ended, both the member and 
his or her spouse must reestablish role responsibilities and expectations.  
CTS data for each member was assigned a quarterly deployment 
beginning and end date based on the total time the member was deployed. From 
the quarterly deployment dates, the number of days a member was deployed per 
quarter was generated. The quarterly CTS data was then paired with the 
demographic data. Total time deployed while married was found by adding all 
quarterly total days deployed while a member was married. Similarly, the 
analysis uses the number of times a member has been deployed. A value of 1 
represents the first deployment while married and so on until the member’s final 
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2. Deployment Location 
The CTS data set used in this study contained all deployments in support 
of OIF or OEF. Deployments that support OIF and OEF are not limited to a 
location in Afghanistan and Iraq. Each Service defines “in support of” differently, 
resulting in widely varying deployment locations that include expected locations 
such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan as well as unexpected locations such as 
Germany and Diego Garcia. For this analysis, location dummies for Afghanistan 
(AF), Iraq (IZ), and the Middle East (MidE; includes countries other than 
Afghanistan and Iraq) were created using the country location identifier provided 
in the CTS data.      
3. Gender 
The data set used in this study included a binary variable capturing a 
Service member’s gender.  
4. Race 
The analysis controlled for race and ethnicity via the following binary 
variables: White, Black, Asian, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Native 
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and unknown.  
5. Rank 
All of the possible rank values were grouped into seven binary variables 
for simplicity: three variables for the enlisted ranks and four variables for officers 
and warrants. The variables were as follows: E1–E3, E4–E6, E7–E9, W1–W5, 
O1–O3, O4–O5, and O6–O10.   
6. Dual Military 
Dual military status was recognized if both spouses were in the military. 
Dual military status is a binary variable, and in this study it was assigned a value 
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7. Number of Dependents 
The number of dependents a member had was represented by a numeric 
value. This variable does not exclusively represent children. Dependents are 
defined as anyone who is financially dependent upon the military member and 
could include a spouse, children, and parents. In this study, a member did not 
need to be married to have a dependent quantity greater than zero.   
8. Prior Marital Status 
A set of binary variables was included to capture a member’s first 
observed marital status. The variables widowed, divorced, never married, and 
unknown had a value of 1 if the member was widowed, divorced, or never 
married prior to the observed marriage. For married Service members, the 
aforementioned variables took a value of 0. This set of variables accounted for 
the effect of a member’s prior relationship on the probability of divorce. The 
unrestricted data set does not observe the entire marriage; therefore, a value of 0 
in each of the above variables indicates that the member’s marriage started prior 
to the first observation. When the variables widowed or divorce have a value of 1 
the member is not in their first marriage. In this way, prior marital experiences 
were partially accounted for. 
9. Length of Marriage 
In order to generate a variable that captured the length of a member’s 
marriage, the following formula was followed: (year and quarter of the last 
observation the member was married) – (year and quarter of the first observation 
the member was married) + 1 = length of a member’s marriage. This variable 
was a proxy for the level of happiness, compatibility, and commitment in the 
member’s marriage (Rosen-Grandon, Myers, & Hattie, 2004). The probability of 








There were three different occupational definitions, based on Service and 
rank, determined by the primary occupational code for each member. Each 
occupational variable was binary, taking a value of 1 if the member was a part of 
that occupation and a value of 0 if the member was not. Both officer and enlisted 
Marine Corps occupations were divided into four categories: combat arms, 
combat support, combat service support, and aviation. Navy officers were divided 
into the following occupations based on their billet codes: surface warfare officer 
(SWO), submariner (SUB), special warfare (SpecWar), special operations 
(SpecOps), human relations (HR), aviation, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), 
public affairs officer (PAO), merchant marine, foreign area officer (FAO), medical, 
chaplain, judge advocate general (JAG), supply, and other. Navy enlisted 
members were divided into the following occupations based on their rating: 
construction, marine engineering, ship maintenance and operations, aviation 
ground support, logistics and administration, health care, cryptology, ordnance, 
communications systems, weapons systems and control, and unrated.       
11. Faith 
The binary faith variable was created to control for religious beliefs that 
may affect the probability of divorce. For this analysis, a member who reported 
his or her religion was assumed to have faith and received a value of 1 for this 
variable.      
12. Entry Year Dummies 
To capture the different factors that prompted a member to join the military 
by year, binary entry year dummies were generated for the years 1957–2009. 
This range accounted of all the possible entry years.  
13. Married Year Dummies 
To capture the different factors that encouraged marriage by year, binary 
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year  was given a value of 1 if the member’s marriage date was in that year and 
a value of 0 if it was not.   
C. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS  
Table 1 shows the unrestricted and restricted aggregate divorce rates for 
each subset of this research from January 1, 2001–September 30, 2009: Navy 
officers, Navy enlistees Marine Corps officers, and Marine Corps enlistees. In all 
cases, there was a difference between the divorce rate of the total sample and 
the divorce rate of members who deployed to OIF and/or OEF. A higher divorce 
rate for deployed members was expected based on the assumption that 
deployment increases the work-interference-with-family conflict. The Marine 
Corps data behaved as Pittman (1994) predicted in his “greedy institution” theory, 
discussed in Chapter II. The Navy data showed a drop in the deployed divorce 
rate from the sample divorce rate, which does not seem to support Pittman’s 
theory.  
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This lower deployed divorce rate may be because only about 20% of the 
Navy sample is deploying in support of OIF/OEF, as shown in Tables 2–5, 
compared to the approximately 30% of the Marine Corps sample. Stated another 
way, OIF/OEF may represent a larger increase in OPTEMPO for the Marine 
Corps than for the Navy and thus have a more significant impact on divorce rates. 
Figures 2–9 show the divorce and deployment rate by year for the restricted and 
unrestricted data in each of the four data sets. The divorce rate by dividing the 
number of divorces by the number of married members per year. The 
deployment rate is the average number of days deployed per member per year.   
 
Figure 2.   Unrestricted Sample of Navy Officer Divorce and Deployment 








Figure 3.   Restricted Sample of Navy Officer Divorce and Deployment 
Rates per Year 
The deployment rates accurately represent the known deployment increase in 
2003, when OIF began, and in 2007, during the surge in deployments to Iraq. It is 
interesting to note that the yearly divorce rate for the unrestricted and restricted 
samples of Navy officers and the unrestricted Navy enlistees has decreased 
since 2003 and 2001, respectively, which may be indicative of the military’s 
enhancement of family support activities. However, the restricted sample of Navy 








Figure 4.   Unrestricted Sample of Navy Enlistee Divorce and Deployment 








Figure 5.   Restricted Sample of Navy Enlistee Divorce and Deployment 
Rates per Year 
Figures 6, 8, 9, and 10, which depict the Marine Corps officer and enlistee 
divorce and deployment rates, show the yearly divorce rate to be relatively 
constant, while the deployment rate increased dramatically in 2003 when the OIF 
began. Figure 7, which depicts the restricted Marine Corps officer data, shows 
more variation in the divorce rate. The increased variation implied that in the 
unrestricted sample, members who entered the Marine Corps prior to 2000 have 
a more stable divorce rate than members who entered the Marine Corps after 
2000. Additionally, the restricted sample was made up of younger individuals 
and, therefore, fewer total marriages, creating more volitility with an increase in 
the number of divorces. The restricted Marine Corps enlistee sample showed a 








Figure 6.   Unrestricted Sample of Marine Corps Officer Divorce and 








Figure 7.   Restricted Sample of Marine Corps Officer Divorce and 
Deployment Rates per Year 
The unrestricted Marine Corps enlistee divorce rate was relatively stable; 
however, it did increase aproximately one year after the major increases in the 








Figure 8.   Unrestricted Sample of Marine Corps Enlistee Divorce and 








Figure 9.   Restricted Sample of Marine Corps Enlistee Divorce and 
Deployment Rates per Year 
Tables 2–5 provide the summary statistics for each of the four subsets of 
data. Each table includes the unrestricted and restricted data. The first column 
within each table gives the dependent variable name. The unrestricted and 
restricted sample columns represent the percentage of the sample made up by 
each dependent variable.  
In Table 2, 19.92% and 37.7% of the members in the unrestricted and 
restricted sample respectively went on one deployment. In Tables 2-5 the third 
and fifth columns give the divorce rate by variable for the restricted and 
unrestricted sample. The divorce rate for the dependent variable deployed to 
OIF/OEF in Table 2, 16.26%, is found by dividing the members who deployed 
and divorced by the total number of members who deployed. 
It is important to note that not all of the marriages in the samples were 
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there were some members who may have been on their second or third 
marriages during these years. A member’s previous marital history was captured 
under the heading of Initial Observed Marital Status. Table 2 shows that 39% of 
the sample was already married at the first observation in the data set. Notice 
that in the unrestricted samples, a higher percentage of individuals were married 
during the first observation. This is important to keep in mind because it means 
that there was no way of knowing when these marriages began or what military 
experiences (including deployments) these Service members had prior to 2000. 
Additionally, assuming that members were married at the start of this research 
means that the calculation for age at the time of marriage is skewed. Age at the 
time of marriage was calculated as the first year and quarter the marriage was 
observed. Notice that for the unrestricted sample, the average age at the time of 
marriage was 37, whereas for the restricted sample, age at the time of marriage 
was 28. 
Table 2 specifically shows descriptive statistics for Navy officers and the 
divorce rate for each individual variable. The sample was 80% male, which was 
expected because 85% of the total Navy officer population is male (DoD, 2008). 
Another defining characteristic of the sample is the fact that 74% of the Navy 
officers in the data were White; this is also in keeping with the total Navy officer 
population, which is 82% White (DoD, 2008). Tables 3–5 exhibit similar 
characteristics for the male and White demographic variables. Under the 
category of occupation, it is interesting to note that divorce rates varied with 
occupation. One of the lowest divorce rates in the sample was for the human 
relations (HR) occupation, at 9%. Traditionally, the HR occupation had less 
demanding training and deployment cycles than other occupational specialties. 
Fewer deployments and less time away from family may result in a lower level of 
work-interference-with-family conflict and, consequently, in a lower divorce rate.   
 
 























Deployment Characteristics         
Deployed to OIF/OEF 22.50% 16.26% 40.04% 8.59% 
Not deployed to OIF/OEF 72.50% 19.66% 59.96% 12.83% 
Number of Deployments         
1 deployment 19.92% 17.16% 37.70% 8.81% 
2 deployments 1.54% 9.88% 1.60% 4.48% 
3 deployments 0.48% 9.43% 0.36% 6.67% 
Greater than 3 deployments 0.55% 7.40% 0.38% 6.25% 
Length of Deployment         
1–90 days 3.93% 19.74% 5.83% 10.25% 
91–180 days 4.66% 13.04% 8.77% 8.45% 
181–365 days 9.29% 8.73% 19.76% 5.68% 
Greater than 365 days 3.32% 4.51% 4.90% 3.90% 
Location of Deployment         
Afghanistan 1.69% 8.39% 3.03% 7.87% 
Iraq 4.17% 13.40% 8.62% 8.59% 
Middle East other than 
Afghanistan or Iraq 5.72% 14.03% 10.22% 8.41% 
          
Demographic Characteristics         
Gender         
Female 13.54% 23.78% 19.11% 18.13% 
Male 81.46% 18.04% 80.89% 9.48% 
Race         
White 74.85% 18.96% 82.90% 10.12% 
Black 4.94% 23.52% 4.52% 12.70% 
Asian 3.22% 22.05% 6.71% 15.66% 
Hawaiian and Pacific Islander 0.17% 29.46% 0.26% 18.18% 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 0.85% 28.52% 1.46% 13.11% 
Rank         
O1–O3 49.85% 19.21% 98.06% 10.82% 
O4–O5 36.14% 20.33% 1.74% 26.03% 
O6–O10 8.11% 9.76% 0.02% 0.00% 
WO1–WO5 0.91% 22.13% 0.00% 0.00% 
Dual Military         
Spouse is in the military  3.64% 15.62% 9.44% 9.11% 
Dependents         
No dependents 6.41% 34.40% 10.89% 13.38% 
1 dependent 25.53% 21.16% 45.51% 12.13% 
2 dependents 18.15% 17.51% 19.28% 8.43% 
3 dependents 27.16% 16.26% 15.24% 10.97% 
Greater than 3 dependents 17.74% 15.27% 9.08% 9.47% 
Occupation at Time of Marriage         




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v - 40 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
SUB 5.35% 13.73% 8.29% 4.03% 
SpecWar 0.76% 21.76% 0.48% 10.00% 
SpecOps 0.53% 21.55% 0.24% 0.00% 
HR 0.37% 8.94% 1.27% 1.89% 
Aviation 21.97% 14.56% 21.00% 6.83% 
EOD 5.86% 21.53% 6.12% 15.63% 
PAO 0.67% 31.29% 0.57% 16.67% 
Merchant Marine 1.59% 14.30% 1.91% 7.50% 
FAO 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 
Medical 21.26% 19.63% 23.96% 14.26% 
Chaplain 1.42% 18.40% 1.72% 22.22% 
JAG 2.10% 16.37% 2.82% 11.02% 
Supply 5.41% 25.15% 5.40% 17.70% 
Other 14.00% 23.54% 15.31% 14.66% 
Faith         
Member chose to record religion 2.60% 1.34% 11.66% 0.20% 
Initial Observed Marital Status         
Divorced 4.25% 23.02% 1.05% 27.27% 
Married 37.48% 21.49% 11.35% 21.05% 
Never Married 51.52% 16.87% 79.19% 9.71% 
Widowed 0.08% 12.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Unknown 1.68% 10.95% 8.24% 8.41% 
          
Age at Time of Marriage 37 36.60 28 30.34 
Sample Size 66211 11861 4186 466 
In Table 3, as in each of the descriptive statistic tables, the divorce rate for 
females, 21%, was higher than each respective Service’s divorce rate. Since 
females in the military are in a nontraditional female job, the role conflict 
experienced in female military marriages may be much higher than that 

























Deployment Characteristics         
Deployed to OIF/OEF 21.65% 14.37% 46.27% 6.38% 
Not deployed to OIF/OEF 78.35% 16.21% 53.73% 8.44% 
Number of Deployments         
1 deployment 20.47% 14.65% 45.14% 6.34% 
2 deployments 0.81% 8.97% 0.92% 8.24% 
3 deployments 0.20% 10.49% 0.11% 0.00% 
Greater than 3 deployments 0.18% 10.42% 0.10% 11.11% 
Length of Deployment         
1–90 days 3.01% 16.57% 6.51% 6.50% 
91–180 days 4.61% 15.56% 12.31% 5.73% 
181–365 days 11.19% 11.62% 24.64% 6.12% 
Greater than 365 days 2.42% 7.47% 2.58% 3.36% 
Location of Deployment         
Afghanistan 0.63% 7.51% 0.39% 8.33% 
Iraq 3.49% 9.60% 1.43% 9.09% 
Middle East other than 
Afghanistan or Iraq 4.99% 10.22% 2.86% 9.47% 
          
Demographic Characteristics         
Gender         
Female 17.87% 21.57% 18.00% 14.04% 
Male 82.13% 14.56% 82.00% 6.05% 
Race         
White 59.37% 16.76% 62.77% 7.57% 
Black 14.92% 19.75% 22.49% 6.22% 
Asian 6.35% 22.20% 4.49% 7.49% 
Hawaiian and Pacific Islander 0.32% 15.50% 0.53% 4.08% 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 2.99% 17.25% 6.44% 8.92% 
Rank         
E1–E3 26.32% 14.60% 74.82% 8.31% 
E4– E6 67.05% 16.79% 25.04% 4.98% 
E7–E9  6.63% 10.73% 0.01% 0.00% 
Dual Military         
Spouse is in the military  5.97% 17.31% 14.82% 7.47% 
Dependents         
No dependents 9.56% 26.51% 12.25% 10.45% 
1 dependent 31.59% 16.23% 50.31% 7.81% 
2 dependents 23.34% 14.57% 24.54% 6.41% 
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Greater than 3 dependents 13.77% 13.02% 3.47% 6.25% 
Occupation at Time of Marriage         
Construction 8.22% 15.55% 1.42% 8.40% 
Marine engineering 8.03% 13.36% 8.44% 3.21% 
Ship maintenance and operations 10.11% 16.54% 9.28% 5.50% 
Aviation ground support 16.46% 14.69% 17.53% 4.89% 
Logistics and administration 21.33% 19.07% 11.15% 9.14% 
Health care 9.09% 15.88% 1.26% 15.52% 
Cryptology 2.95% 18.27% 1.71% 7.59% 
Ordnance  3.34% 18.35% 2.55% 2.55% 
Communications systems 1.96% 15.90% 1.61% 3.38% 
Weapons system and control 3.90% 15.35% 0.56% 15.38% 
Faith         
Member chose to record religion 34.82% 17.47% 90.17% 7.19% 
Initial Observed Marital Status         
Divorced 5.53% 18.06% 0.60% 16.36% 
Married 27.46% 17.81% 5.60% 16.28% 
Never married 66.65% 14.84% 93.53% 6.90% 
Widowed 0.10% 16.17% 0.01% 0.00% 
Unknown 0.26% 6.35% 0.12% 0.00% 
         
Age at Time of Marriage 31 30.57 23 23.15 
Sample Size 163971 25926 9218 690 
 
 In Table 4, the divorce rate for dual military couples, 15.13%, was higher 
than the sample average, 7.44%. In these cases, both spouses were at risk of 
deploying, which increased the chance of role conflict and divorce. However, the 
Navy samples shown in Tables 2 and 3 did not have a higher divorce rate for 
dual military couples than the sample average. The difference between dual 
military couples’ divorce rates suggests fundamental differences in how orders 
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Deployment Characteristics        
Deployed to OIF/OEF 35.73% 8.08% 49.08% 4.18% 
Not deployed to OIF/OEF 64.27% 7.09% 50.92% 4.84% 
Number of Deployments        
1 deployment 33.66% 8.27% 46.82% 4.39% 
2 deployments 1.63% 5.38% 2.05% 0.00% 
3 deployments 0.30% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 
Greater than 3 deployments 0.15% 5.00% 0.21% 0.00% 
Length of Deployment        
1–90 days 2.40% 10.64% 4.72% 4.35% 
91–180 days 4.94% 8.57% 5.13% 0.00% 
181–365 days 13.77% 6.83% 25.26% 4.88% 
Greater than 365 days 14.33% 6.77% 13.55% 1.52% 
Location of Deployment        
Afghanistan 2.55% 5.71% 5.13% 8.00% 
Iraq 16.25% 6.73% 31.42% 3.92% 
Middle East other than 
Afghanistan or Iraq 8.10% 7.02% 12.11% 3.39% 
         
Demographic Characteristics        
Gender        
Female 5.34% 14.05% 5.95% 10.34% 
Male 94.66% 7.07% 94.05% 4.15% 
Race        
White 82.11% 7.45% 72.90% 5.63% 
Black 4.45% 12.13% 3.49% 0.00% 
Asian 1.74% 8.37% 4.31% 4.76% 
Hawaiian and Pacific Islander 0.35% 29.17% 0.41% 0.00% 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 3.86% 7.74% 11.91% 1.72% 
Rank        
O1–O3 48.41% 9.10% 100.00% 4.52% 
O4–O5 37.98% 6.24% 0.00% 0.00% 
O6–O10 6.34% 2.41% 0.00% 0.00% 
WO1–WO5  7.26% 7.13% 0.00% 0.00% 
Dual Military        
Spouse is in the military  3.47% 15.13% 8.21% 12.50% 
Dependents        
No dependents 31.02% 2.05% 8.21% 7.50% 
1 dependent 25.81% 12.20% 60.99% 5.39% 
2 dependents 13.94% 9.78% 18.07% 2.27% 
3 dependents 17.59% 8.13% 9.24% 2.22% 
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Occupation at Time of Marriage        
Combat arms 22.71% 7.61% 17.04% 4.82% 
Combat support 6.30% 9.14% 5.13% 4.00% 
Combat service support 26.88% 8.16% 21.36% 1.92% 
Aviation 28.42% 6.98% 18.48% 5.56% 
Faith        
Member chose to record religion 94.13% 7.23% 83.37% 3.94% 
Initial Observed Marital Status        
Divorced 7.85% 8.27% 1.03% 0.00% 
Married 54.43% 8.00% 11.91% 6.90% 
Never married 36.68% 6.34% 82.34% 4.49% 
Widowed 0.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Unknown 0.87% 13.33% 4.72% 0.00% 
         
Age at Time of Marriage 36.36 33.13 25.56 24.70 
Sample Size 13715 1021 487 22 
 
The unrestricted Marine Corps enlistee sample (Table 5) shows that fewer than 
1% of married Marines went on more than three deployments. The divorce rate 
for members who went on more than three deployments was 10% higher than 
the aggregate sample divorce rate. This suggests that completing more than 
three deployments puts an excessive strain on the family role, resulting in marital 
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Deployment Characteristics        
Deployed to OIF/OEF 35.38% 8.76% 59.16% 5.42% 
Not deployed to OIF/OEF 64.62% 8.09% 40.84% 6.90% 
Number of Deployments        
1 deployment 34.30% 8.78% 57.89% 5.46% 
2 deployments 0.96% 8.13% 1.24% 3.40% 
3 deployments 0.10% 8.18% 0.02% 0.00% 
Greater than 3 deployments 0.02% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Length of Deployment        
1–90 days 2.54% 9.67% 4.35% 6.38% 
91–180 days 8.04% 8.00% 12.34% 5.72% 
181–365 days 17.11% 8.39% 31.32% 5.09% 
Greater than 365 days 7.39% 6.78% 10.86% 3.78% 
Location of Deployment        
Afghanistan 1.04% 7.78% 1.33% 5.91% 
Iraq 16.21% 8.86% 30.58% 5.47% 
Middle East other than 
Afghanistan or Iraq 6.10% 6.53% 9.03% 4.54% 
         
Gender        
Female 7.21% 16.95% 9.25% 15.72% 
Male 92.79% 7.66% 90.75% 5.03% 
Race        
White 66.75% 9.20% 78.60% 6.07% 
Black 8.44% 9.62% 0.92% 61.44% 
Asian 1.77% 11.57% 2.17% 6.41% 
Hawaiian and Pacific Islander 0.42% 10.87% 0.62% 6.86% 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 1.72% 11.99% 2.33% 6.22% 
Rank        
E1–E3 46.11% 10.23% 75.67% 7.44% 
E4–E6 50.06% 6.86% 24.21% 1.50% 
E7–E9  3.83% 4.59% 0.00% 0.00% 
Dual Military        
Spouse is in the military  6.98% 16.49% 11.86% 10.18% 
Dependents        
No dependents 8.38% 12.17% 6.58% 4.03% 
1 dependent 48.52% 8.95% 61.86% 6.75% 
2 dependents 25.39% 6.98% 23.45% 5.20% 
3 dependents 12.38% 6.69% 6.41% 4.61% 
Greater than 3 dependents 5.33% 6.77% 1.69% 3.93% 
Occupation at Time of Marriage        
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Combat support 14.20% 7.42% 13.57% 5.29% 
Combat service support 34.85% 8.94% 36.61% 6.13% 
Aviation 14.40% 8.93% 7.12% 7.46% 
Faith        
Member chose to record religion 92.83% 8.21% 90.13% 5.80% 
Initial Observed Marital Status        
Divorced 2.83% 9.42% 0.69% 5.26% 
Married 19.23% 8.83% 3.11% 16.89% 
Never married 77.91% 8.16% 96.06% 5.65% 
Widowed 0.02% 7.69% 0.01% 0.00% 
Unknown 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 
        
 Age at Time of Marriage 24.66 23.62 21.99 21.41 
Sample Size 108732 9052 16572 998 
Figure 10 highlights the difference in divorce rates for members of the 
unrestricted sample who deploy and those who do nondeploy. The data from 
2001 to 2003 showed an increase in the divorce rate of both deployed and 
nondeployed members. The increase for not deployed members from 2002–2003, 
may capture the effect of deployments not included in the CTS database that still 
increase because of the attacks on 9/11. After 2003, the nondeployed divorce 
rate steadily decreased while the deployed divorce rate vacillated from 0.02–0.03. 
The unrestricted sample of Navy officers in Figure 2 showed an overall 
decreasing trend when both deployed and nondeployed Service members were 
combined into one divorce rate. Figure 10 reveals that the decreasing trend in 
the divorce rates for nondeployed members overshadowed the divorce rate for 









Note. The data for 2009 only covers until September 30, 2009. 
Figure 10.   Unrestricted Sample of Navy Officers Deployed and 
Nondeployed Divorce Rate 
Figure 11 shows the unrestricted Navy enlistee divorce rate for deployed 
and nondeployed members. Similar to Figure 10, Figure 11 shows a deployed 
divorce rate that increased from 2001–2003 and then vacillated from 0.02–0.03, 
while the nondeployed divorce rate decreased. Figure 4 shows a decreasing 
trend in the divorce rate for the entire unrestricted sample of Navy enlistees, 










Note. The data for 2009 only covers until September 30, 2009. 
Figure 11.   Unrestricted Sample of Navy Enlistees Deployed and 
Nondeployed Divorce Rate 
Figure 12 shows the unrestricted Marine Corps officer divorce rate for 
deployed and nondeployed members. As seen with the unrestricted Navy data 
sets, the unrestricted Marine Corps officer deployed divorce rate was greater 
than the nondeployed divorce rate, which decreased. Figure 6 shows a 
decreasing trend in the divorce rate for the entire unrestricted Marine Corps 
officer sample, masking the difference in the divorce rate for deployed and 
nondeployed Marine Corps officer members. It is interesting to note the spike in 
both the deployed and nondeployed divorce rate in 2007, which corresponds to 
the surge of operations in Iraq. Figure 6 and 7, which depict the deployment rate, 
show a relatively steady rate for the unrestricted sample and an increasing trend 
for the restricted sample from 2006–2008. This may suggest that in anticipation 
of increased deployments or in preparing to deploy, marriages experienced a 








Note. The data for 2009 only covers until September 30, 2009. 
Figure 12.   Unrestricted Sample of Marine Corps Officers Deployed and 
Nondeployed Divorce Rate 
Figure 13 shows the unrestricted Marine Corps enlistee divorce rate for 
deployed and nondeployed members. Unlike Figures 10, 11 and 12, Figure 13 
depicts a nondeployed divorce rate that fluctuated from 2001–2009, spiking in 
2009. Based on Figure 8, which depicts the aggregate unrestricted Marine Corps 
enlistee divorce rate, the nondeployed divorce rate still overshadowed the 










Note. The data for 2009 only covers until September 30, 2009. 
Figure 13.   Unrestricted Sample of Marine Corps Enlistees Deployed and 
Nondeployed Divorce Rate 
D. SUMMARY 
Chapter IV defined each variable and reviewed the initial descriptive 
statistics for the four unrestricted and restricted data sets—Navy officers, Navy 
enlistees, Marine Corps officers, and Marine Corps enlistees. Based on the 
difference between the sample divorce rate and the Service divorce rate, the 
hypothesis that deployment to OEF/OIF is affecting the divorce rate appeared to 
be supported. However, the divorce rate comparisons in this section do not take 
into account other intervening factors, such as demographics and work 
requirements proxied by rank and occupation. The next section investigates 
whether the observed differences in divorce rates between deployed and 
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V. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
This chapter discusses the multivariate models specification and the 
results of the regression analysis. Section A presents the theoretical model 
selected. Section B presents the empirical estimates obtained from probit models. 
A. MODEL SPECIFICATION  
The dependent variable divorced was a binary variable. To predict the 
probability of divorce, probit models were used. A probit model is a maximum 
likelihood estimator that uses the standard normal density to approximate the 
probability of success as a function of observed variables. The probit model only 
allowed the predicted probabilities to vary between 0 and 1, which is an 
advantage over a standard linear probability model in which predicted 
probabilities can be greater than 1 or less than 0. The theoretical model is as 
follows: 
P (divorce = 1|x) =  (0 + x).     (1) 
The model states that the probability of divorce is a function of the vectors 
of each of the independent variables included on the right-hand side of the 
equation.  
To determine if a member’s marital status changed due to an increase in 
OPTEMPO, the monthly panel data were collapsed into one entry per person.2  
1. General Models 
A member’s ability to be successful in marriage is shaped by a myriad of 
factors. A member’s maturity, upbringing, family experiences, education, salary, 
prior marital history, and other roles he or she is responsible for, in addition to 
being a spouse, will all contribute to the success or demise of a marriage. Not all 
                                            
2  A panel logit model was considered, which did not require collapsing the data; however, 
not enough EDIPNs were both deployed and divorced. The resultant small sample size made the 
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factors are measureable. Three probit models were estimated both on the 
unrestricted and the restricted samples. All models had the following common 
control variables: deployment location, gender, number of dependents, spouse in 
the military, prior marital status, rank, race, occupation, year of entry into the 
military, and faith. Estimation for the restricted samples included the variables 
controlling for the length of marriage, age at the time of marriage, and date of 
marriage.3  
The main difference across the three models was the way in which 
deployments were hypothesized to influence divorce. Similar to other studies, the 
analysis in the first model provided an estimate of the probability of divorce as a 
function of the number of deployments. However, the number of deployments 
may not have been an accurate measure of the time that the member spent 
away from home. The number of deployments in the CTS data set recorded 
anything from one day to 365 or more days as a deployment. This means that if 
just the number of deployments were used, a person who deployed three times 
for 60 days each time would count the same as a member who deployed three 
times for 14 days each time. Both members would have spent time away from 
their families but not for the same length of time. The variable number of days 
deployed did not alone indicate the length of each deployment. Two members 
could both be deployed for 60 days, but one member could have two 30-day 
deployments and the other could have six 10-day deployments. To ensure that 
the amount of time deployed was captured in a way that represented the strain it 
exerted on a member’s family role, the models were run to vary how the strain of 
deployment was accounted for. Specifically, each model included the following: 
 Model 1: total days deployed was the key variable of interest and was 
controlled for because it captured time-based strain conflict—one of the 
elements in work-interference-with-family conflict (Greenhaus & Beutell, 
1985).  
 
                                            
3 This information could not be determined accurately for the unrestricted data set and thus 
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P (divorce = 1|x) =  (0 + 1 total days deployed + 2 control variables + e).  (2) 
 
 Model 2: number of separate deployments was the key variable of interest 
and was controlled for because in role conflict, which work-interference-with-
family conflict is a type of, there are three categories of conflicts: time-based, 
strain-based, and behavioral-based (Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985). The 
variable for the number of deployments did not measure the length of 
deployment; it only measured if a member departed and then returned. The 
act of getting ready to deploy and then returning from deployment induced 
strain-based and behavioral-based conflict. 
 
P (divorce = 1|x) =  (0 + 1 number of deployments + 2 control variables + e). (3) 
 
 Model 3: months deployed and number of separate deployments were the 
key variables of interest. Including both months deployed, and the number of 
separate deployments accounted for the three different types of conflict a 
member and his or her family might experience.  
 
P (divorce = 1|x) =  (0 + 1 months deployed + 2 number of deployments + 3 
control variables + e).   (4) 
 
Each of these three models were estimated separately for the four samples—
Navy officers, Navy enlistees, Marine Corps officers, and Marine Corps 
enlistees—and updated with the corresponding occupations for each.  
B. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Tables 6–13 present the marginal effects from the probit estimations for 
both the unrestricted and restricted samples (full results and probit coefficients 
appear in the appendices). The following model analysis presented in Tables 6-
13 focuses on the key variables that described a member’s deployment. In each 
table, three sets of results are presented. The first column of each table only 
includes variables that account for the length of a member’s deployment. The 
second column only includes variables that account for the number of 
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number of deployments. The tables present data for Navy officers first, followed 
by Navy enlistees, Marine Corps officers, and finally Marine Corps enlistees.   
1. Navy Officers 
Table 6 presents the results for the unrestricted sample of Navy officers. 
Results from the restricted sample appear in Table 7. In the unrestricted model, 
the variables representing number of days deployed and number of months 
deployed were negative and statistically significant at the 1%. At the onset of this 
research, the number of days a member deployed was thought to be a 
contributing factor to the marital stress—specifically the time-based conflict 
component. The negative coefficient suggests that time-based conflict is 
something that military families are able to adapt to. The number of months 
deployed while married can be interpreted in the following way: for each month 
deployed while married, the probability of divorce decreases by 0.03 percentage 
points. A member deployed for six months decreases his or her probability of 
divorce by 0.18 percentage points.  
The second column in Tables 6-13, shows the results of the second model 
where deployment length variable is replaced by the number of deployments 
variable. The variable representing more than one deployment while married was 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 6). According to the 
second column of Table 6, a Navy officer who went on more than one 
deployment was 0.074 percentage points less likely to divorce than a Navy 
officer who did not deploy.   
The third column in Tables 6-13, results of the third model, includes 
variables that account for both the length of deployment and number of 
deployments. This is intended to capture the stress on a marriage from pre- and 
post-deployment transitions, while accounting for length of deployment (total time 
apart from spouse). In the third column months deployed was negative and 
significant at the 1% level, and 1 to 3 or more deployments while married were 
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same length of time, the member who was deployed two times while married 
increased his or her likelihood of divorce by 0.224 percentage points. As 
displayed in Figure 14 after the second deployment, the marginal effect of three 
or more deployments decreased, even though it remained positive.  
Diminishing returns shown in Figure 14 suggests that spouses in 
marriages that survived two deployments developed a coping method for the 
conflict created by deployments. Deployment location variables representing 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East varied in significance and sign (positive 
and negative) but were included in all the models to control for the conditions of 
the deployment and potential work stress on the deployed spouse. 
Table 6.   Unrestricted Sample of Navy Officers Marginal Effects 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1–90 days deployed 
while married 
-0.032***   




-0.084***   




-0.128***   
 (0.004)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while 
married 
-0.153***   
 (0.003)   
Number of months 
deployed while 
married 
  -0.030*** 
   (0.001) 
1 deployment while 
married 
 -0.003 0.142*** 
  (0.005) (0.008) 
Greater than 1 
deployment while 
married 
 -0.074***  
  (0.008)  








   (0.026) 
3 deployments while 
married 
  0.185*** 
   (0.042) 
Greater than 3 
deployments while 
married 
  0.105*** 
   (0.036) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
-0.020 -0.092*** -0.056*** 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.062*** -0.047*** 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) 
Deployed to the 
Middle East (other 
than Afghanistan and 
Iraq) 
0.053*** -0.037*** -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Observations 61775 61775 61775 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 












Figure 14.   Summary of Marginal Effects of Deployment for Unrestricted 
Sample of Navy Officers Model 
The restricted sample size was 3,579, approximately 5% of the 
unrestricted sample. Due to the decreased sample size, there were fewer 
individuals who experienced deployments and subsequent divorces; this caused 
many of the previous significant variables to no longer be significant. However, 
the restricted model’s marginal effects were more precise than the unrestricted 
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majority of a member’s marital and deployment history. The restricted model 
included the following additional variables: length of marriage, age at the time of 
marriage, and year of marriage.  
In the third model, results displayed in column three, the number of 
months a member was deployed and one deployment while married were still 
statistically significant at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. A member who 
deployed one time was 0.042 percentage points more likely to divorce than a 
member who did not deploy. Stated another way, Navy Officers who deployed 
once increased their likelihood of divorce by 37%. Additionally, the marginal 
effects of one deployment while married in the second and third model, results in 
column two and three, were positive and significant, 0.026 and 0.042, 
respectively (Table 7). Both aforementioned variables were positive and 
significant, just as in the unrestricted model. The similarities between the 
unrestricted and restricted models affirm that the results of the unrestricted model 
are valid.   
Table 7.   Restricted Sample of Navy Officers Marginal Effects 
 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1–90 days deployed 
while married 
0.022   




0.021   




0.006   
 (0.013)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while 
married 
0.016   
 (0.026)   
Number of months 
deployed while 








   (0.001) 
1 deployment while 
married 
 0.026** 0.042*** 
  (0.012) (0.015) 
Greater than 1 
deployment while 
married 
 0.039 0.091 
  (0.046) (0.074) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
0.004 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.007 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) 
Deployed to the 
Middle East (other 
than Afghanistan and 
Iraq) 
0.023 0.013 0.016 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) 
Observations 3579 3579 3579 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
= significant at 1%. 
2. Navy Enlistees  
Table 8 presents the marginal effects from probit models using the 
unrestricted sample of Navy enlistees. Table 9 presents the results from models 
using the restricted sample. In Table 8, the coefficient of the variables that 
represented 91–180 days deployed, 181–365 days deployed, greater than 365 
days deployed, and number of months deployed were negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This was similar to the results obtained using the 
unrestricted sample of Navy officers.  
In the second model, a member who went on one deployment, 0.005 
percentage point increase, was 3.27% more likely to divorce than a member who 
did not. When the number of months a member was deployed was controlled for, 
the marginal effect of one deployment increased to 0.072 percentage points. In 
the third model, the variables 1 deployment while married through 3 deployments 
while married were positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, and 
greater than three deployments was positive and statistically significant at the 
10% level. Respectively, this represented a 45%, 44%, 55%, and 36% increased 
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illustrates the diminishing return of number of deployments. For Navy enlistees, 
the effect of deployments on the likelihood of divorce decreased after three 
deployments. 
Table 8.   Unrestricted Sample of Navy Enlistees Marginal Effects 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1–90 days deployed 
while married 
-0.007   
 (0.005)   
91 –180 days 
deployed while 
married 
-0.015***   




-0.041***   
 (0.003)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while 
married 
-0.078***   
 (0.005)   
Number of months 
deployed while 
married 
  -0.012*** 
   (0.001) 
1 deployment while 
married 
 0.005* 0.072*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
Greater than 1 
deployment while 
married 
 -0.038***  
  (0.008)  
2 deployments while 
married 
  0.070*** 
   (0.016) 
3 deployments while 
married 
  0.087*** 
   (0.031) 
Greater than 3 
deployments while 
married 
  0.056* 
   (0.029) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
-0.047*** -0.071*** -0.050*** 
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Deployed to Iraq -0.015*** -0.050*** -0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Deployed to the 
Middle East (other 
than Afghanistan and 
Iraq) 
-0.027*** -0.058*** -0.037*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Observations 163525 163525 163525 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 










Figure 15.   Unrestricted Sample of Navy Enlistees Model Marginal Effects 
of Deployment 
Table 9 presents the estimates from the restricted sample of Navy enlisted 
personnel. Deploying 181–365 days and going on one deployment were both 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in the first and second model, 
respectively. For a Navy enlistee who deployed 181-365 days, he or she was 
15% more likely to divorce than a member who did not deploy. The marginal 
effect of one deployment, 0.008 percentage points, increased the likelihood of 
divorce by 10% in the second model. This was a 7% increase in the likelihood of 
divorce from the unrestricted model discussed previously.  
The third model is further confirmation that the signs of the third 
unrestricted model are valid, since number of days deployed was negative and 
number of deployments was positive, as seen in the Table 8 coefficients. The 
restriction of this sample to members whose total military service was observed 
for approximately four years limits the number of members who divorced to 690 
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deployed one or more times (2.7% of the original data). The average length of 
marriage in the restricted data set was 2.4 years. The fact that being deployed a 
quarter to half of the members total married time increased the likelihood that a 
member would divorce is consistent with the role conflict discussed in Chapter 2.  
Table 9.   Restricted Sample of Navy Enlistees Marginal Effects 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1–90 days deployed 
while married 
-0.001   




0.000   




0.012**   
 (0.005)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while 
married 
0.010   
 (0.014)   
Number of months 
deployed while 
married 
  0.000 
   (0.001) 
1 deployment while 
married 
 0.008** 0.007 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
Greater than 1 
deployment while 
married 
 0.040 0.039 
  (0.030) (0.033) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
-0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Deployed to the 
Middle East (other 
than Afghanistan and 
Iraq) 
0.017 0.015 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
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Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
= significant at 1%. 
3. Marine Corps Officers  
Table 10 presents marginal effects from the probit models for the 
unrestricted sample of Marine Corps officers. Table 11 presents the same 
estimates for the restricted sample. In Table 10, the variables measuring length 
of deployment were all negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficients representing 181–365 and greater than 365 days, -0.018 and -0.016, 
equated to a 24% and 22% decrease in the likelihood of divorce, respectively. 
The fact that the number of days deployed had such a strong impact on the 
likelihood of divorce reinforced the difference between the stress exerted by the 
length of deployment and the act of going on deployment. One deployment while 
married was positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for the third 
model; this was consistent throughout the previously presented unrestricted 
results. In the third model, Marine Corps officers who deployed on time were 
32% more likely to divorce. The Afghanistan, Iraq, and Middle East coefficients 
were negative but vary in significance. The negative sign of the deployment 
location coefficients may indicate that Marine Corps officers deployed closer to 
combat had a greater satisfaction in his or her time spent at work. A greater 
satisfaction with time spent at work could translate to less work-family conflict, as 
suggested by Pittman’s (1994) work on greedy institutions.  
Table 10.   Unrestricted Sample of Marine Corps Officers Marginal Effects 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1–90 days deployed while 
married 
0.016   
 (0.015)   
91–180 days deployed 
while married 
-0.005   
 (0.009)   








 (0.006)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while married 
-0.016**   
 (0.007)   
Number of months 
deployed while married 
  -0.001*** 
   (0.000) 
1 deployment while married  0.010 0.024*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Greater than 1 deployment 
while married 
 -0.012  
  (0.015)  
2 deployments while 
married 
  0.009 
   (0.022) 
3 deployments while 
married 
  -0.034 
   (0.029) 
Greater than 3 deployments 
while married 
  0.001 
   (0.063) 
Deployed to Afghanistan -0.012 -0.022** -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Deployed to Iraq -0.005 -0.020*** -0.013** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Deployed to the Middle 
East (other than 
Afghanistan and Iraq) 
-0.001 -0.014* -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
Observations 13111 13111 13111 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
= significant at 1%. 
 
The restricted Marine Corps officers’ marginal effects are presented in 
Table 11. None of the key variables’ coefficients were statistically significant.  
Table 11.   Restricted Sample of Marine Corps Officers Marginal Effects 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1–90 days deployed while 
married 
-0.001   
 (0.001)   
181–365 days deployed 
while married 
-0.003   
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Greater than 365 days 
deployed 
-0.003   
 (0.005)   
Number of months 
deployed while married 
  -0.000 
   (0.000) 
1 deployment while married  0.000 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.001) 
Deployed to Afghanistan 0.314 0.158 0.364 
 (0.234) (0.151) (0.296) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.015 0.003 0.008 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.014) 
Deployed to the Middle East 
(other than Afghanistan and 
Iraq) 
0.010 0.001 0.005 
 (0.022) (0.006) (0.013) 
Observations 284 289 289 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
= significant at 1%. 
4. Marine Corps Enlistees 
The unrestricted Marine Corps enlistees models’ marginal effects are 
presented in Table 12, and the restricted results are in Table 13. In the 
unrestricted model, the coefficient of the variables that represent 91–180 days 
deployed, 181–365 days deployed, greater than 365 days deployed, and number 
of months deployed were negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. For 
the significant coefficients in the previous sentence, Marine Corps enlistees were 
17%, 16%, and 34% less likely to divorce. One deployment while married was 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for the second and third model. 
In the second model, the .008 percentage points increase for one deployment 
equated to a 10% increase in the likelihood of divorce. In the third model, the 
coefficients for the number of deployments increased through greater than 3 
deployments, as displayed in Figure 20. The increase represents an increase in 
the likelihood of divorce for the unrestricted Marine Corps enlistee sample each 
time he or she went on an additional deployment, by 26% and 43%4. A lack of 
diminishing returns, as seen in the other unrestricted models, indicated that at no 
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point did enlisted Marines develop a coping method for the stress of transitioning 
to deployment on the family.  
The Afghanistan, Iraq, and Middle East coefficients vary in sign and 
significance. In Model 1 and Model 2, the variable representing a deployment to 
Iraq was positive and significant at the 1% level. The fact that the Iraq location 
coefficient was negative contradicts the unrestricted Marine Corps officer models, 
representing a possible difference in the way Marines officers and enlistees view 
deployment to areas closer to combat.  
Table 12.   Unrestricted Sample of Marine Corps Enlistees Marginal 
Effects 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1–90 days deployed while 
married 
0.003   
 (0.005)   
91–180 days deployed 
while married 
-0.014***   
 (0.003)   
181–365 days deployed 
while married 
-0.013***   
 (0.003)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while married 
-0.028***   
 (0.003)   
Number of months 
deployed while married 
  -0.002*** 
   (0.000) 
1 deployment while married  0.008*** 0.022*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Greater than 1 deployment 
while married 
 0.005  
  (0.009)  
2 deployments while 
married 
  0.036*** 
   (0.012) 
3 deployments while 
married 
  0.056 
   (0.038) 
Greater than 3 deployments 
while married 
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   (0.105) 
Deployed to Afghanistan 0.023** 0.003 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.024*** 0.003 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Deployed to the Middle 
East (other than 
Afghanistan and Iraq) 
0.000 -0.016*** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 108081 108081 108081 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
= significant at 1%. 
 
Figure 16.   Unrestricted Sample of Marine Corps Enlistees Model Marginal 
Effects of Deployment 
The restricted Marine Corps enlistees’ marginal effects for the variables 
representing 91–180 days deployed, 181–365 days deployed, and greater than 
365 days deployed were positive and statically significant at the 5% level. Stated 
in terms of likelihood, a Marine Corps enlistee was 8.7%, 8.9%, and 14.5% more 
likely to divorce than a nondeployed member. This and the restricted Navy 
enlistee model (Table 9) were the only models to have positive and significant 
coefficients for a variable representing length of deployment. The length of 
deployment variable may have captured an inability of enlisted members to 
maintain a marriage over long periods of separation. It could be the case that 
enlistees’ spouses were ill equipped to manage the additional role responsibilities 
while the Service member was deployed. The coefficient may represent a lack of 
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would correspond to the younger age group and level of experience that the 
restricted enlistee samples captured. The variable representing one deployment 
while married was also positive and significant at the 1% level, likely also 
capturing a lack of enlisted Marines’ ability to cope with separation from their 
spouse.   
Table 13.   Restricted Sample of Marine Corps Enlistees Marginal Effects 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1–90 days deployed while 
married 
0.003   
 (0.004)   
91–180 days deployed 
while married 
0.005**   
 (0.003)   
181–365 days deployed 
while married 
0.005**   
 (0.002)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while married 
0.009**   
 (0.004)   
Number of months 
deployed while married 
  -0.000 
   (0.000) 
1 deployment while married  0.005*** 0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Greater than 1 deployment 
while married 
 0.003 0.004 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
Deployed to Afghanistan 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Deployed to the Middle 
East (other than 
Afghanistan and Iraq) 
0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 16331 16331 16331 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
= significant at 1%. 
The results from the third unrestricted model were robust in that when the 
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to no variation. The third unrestricted model was chosen for robustness testing 
because this model accounted for the length of deployments and the number of 
deployments a member completed during his or her marriage. To test the 
robustness, five additional models were estimated; the key variables were the 
same throughout the models.  
The control variables varied for each model in the following order: an 
additional variable was added to represent if a member left the military, and both 
rank and occupation variables were taken at the last observation instead of at the 
first observation, singularly and then jointly included in the models. This process 
was repeated for all four samples: Navy officers, Navy enlistees, Marine Corps 
officers, and Marine Corps enlistees. Results of the regressions are presented in 
Appendices I–J. The key variables’ coefficients varied on average 0.01 
percentage point or fewer.  
The control variables had the following trends throughout the different data 
sets and models. Female members had a positive coefficient, meaning females 
were more likely to divorce than males. This is in keeping with the RAND study 
on military divorce (Karney & Crown, 2007). In general, a greater number of 
dependents decreased the likelihood of divorce.5 Members in their first marriage 
had a negative coefficient and thus were less likely to divorce than members who 
had previously been married. Marrying at a younger age increased the likelihood 
of divorce. Members who married prior to age 25, had previously been married, 
and or who were married without children were all known to be at a higher risk of 
divorce—the models controlled for this and the data behaved as expected 
(Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, 2006). Occupation variables varied and cannot 
concisely be summarized. An exception to this is in the restricted sample Navy 
Officers marginal effects, where the only significant occupation was HR. Having 
an HR occupational code decreased the likelihood of divorce.  
                                            








All members who were married during 2000–2009 are at risk of divorce. In 
the unrestricted models, each of these at-risk members was included in the 
regression. In the unrestricted models, the data was limited in that the date of 
marriage for members who were married prior to 1999 could not be determined. 
Thus, an accurate length of marriage and age at the time of marriage could not 
be determined. By restricting the data to four years of observed service for the 
enlistee sets and 5–10 years of observed service for the officer sets, a member’s 
date of marriage could be determined, and thus, age at the time of marriage and 
length of marriage could be factored into the regression accounting for more of 
the previously unobservable factors. However, the restricted sample can only 
capture individuals who are young and still at a very early stage of marriage. 
The effects of deployment on divorce rates vary somewhat, depending on 
whether one examines the general active duty population (the unrestricted 
sample) or the younger/early-marriage sample (the restricted sample). In the 
unrestricted sample, after controlling for months of deployment, the number of 
deployments while married was consistently significant and positive across six 
out of the eight models. This suggests that in the general active duty population, 
the length of the deployment is not as great a factor in creating marital conflict as 
the actual act of deploying. The unrestricted data set was large enough to have a 
significant number of members who deployed on more than one deployment. As 
the number of deployments increased in most cases, so did the coefficient 
representing the likelihood of divorce. In the Navy officer and enlistee models, 
the coefficients did not increase linearly and appear to peak at two and three 
deployments, respectively—this could suggest that beyond a certain threshold, 
families that are still intact adjust and accept the frequent separation. Additionally, 
families that have the most difficult time with deployment and separation likely 
divorced after the first deployment, thus removing them in follow-on deployment 
analyses. Even if families adapted to deployment, the divorce rate for deployed 
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However, in the restricted Navy and Marine Corps enlistee models, the 
number of days deployed in the first model was positive and significant—the 
largest effect occurred in the 181–365 days category for the Navy and at the 
greater than 365 days category for the Marine Corps. The results suggest that in 
the restricted data set, where the overall length of marriage was shorter and the 
average age of the sample was younger, longer separation from a spouse and 
the act of deploying caused significant marital conflict. It is clear, based on these 
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VI. MILITARY COST OF DIVORCE 
A. RELEVANCE 
In the field of labor economics, companies are assumed to be maximizers, 
generally trying to produce more with less. Companies that are maximizers strive 
to maximize their profits by increasing revenue from production or decreasing the 
cost of production.  
The military can also be thought of as a company that is trying to produce 
more with less. Instead of producing a profit, the military is trying to increase 
national security with a fixed or decreasing budget. The military is heavily reliant 
on manual labor. For the military to increase national security, maximizing 
military members’ productivity would be a logical part of the process. Increasing 
worker productivity effectively increases the military’s budget without actually 
expanding the one that Congress set. When worker productivity is increased, the 
military increases the amount of labor accomplished per wage. Conversely, if 
worker productivity is lost, less labor is accomplished per wage.   
B. THEORETICAL MODEL 
All companies strive to increase worker productivity. However, there are 
some practical problems that prevent the development of a universal formula for 
increasing worker productivity. The first problem is that each worker has a 
different set of preferences that make up his or her most productive work 
environment. The second problem is that if a company could set the right 
environment, how would worker productivity be measured? In most companies, 
worker productivity is—at least in part—a subjective measure made by one or 
more supervisors. However, absenteeism is measurable, and studies have 
shown that worker productivity within a company environment is directly linked to 
worker absenteeism. This leads to the conclusion that changes in worker 
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military worker, physical absenteeism is not tolerated, but absenteeism by way of 
decreased productivity or refusal to complete work in a timely manner occurs.   
Marital tension can lead to more than worker absenteeism. Divorced 
adults have consistently been found to have higher incidences of depression, 
anger, anxiety, loneliness, suicide, decreased immune system, and earlier death 
(Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, 2006). Although some divorces are amicable, most 
divorces still induce a level of stress on the divorcing people—the majority of 
studies have found that there is a transition period for all divorces in which the 
worker is more likely to suffer from the above-mentioned conditions. It is 
important to note that the impact of a divorce is different for men and women. 
Over 80% of the military’s members are male, and men are more likely to find the 
initial separation more difficult to handle than women, who sometimes have more 
persistent problems such as depression (DoD, 2008; Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, 
2006).   
In the study “Associations Between Marital Distress and Work Loss in a 
National Sample,” Forthofer et al. (1996) found that martial distress was 
positively associated with work loss. The study combined metrics for work loss 
due to cutbacks and absenteeism with marital quality data from the National 
Comorbidity Survey (NCS). The number of workdays lost was estimated through 
two questions that assessed if the respondent was able to conduct normal tasks 
within the last 30 days. Results from the work-loss questions were coupled with a 
question assessing marital conflict (Forthofer et al., 1996). Only employed and 
married respondents were considered in the population; this resulted in a sample 
of 1,431 men and 1,138 women (Forthofer et al., 1996).   
Forthofer et al. (1996) separated the analysis of men and women in their 
study. For women, they found no statistical significance between marital distress 
measures and work loss. However, in the male sample, they found that marital 
distress had an increased and significant effect on work loss (Forthofer et al., 
1996). The study concluded that gender and marital duration had a significant 
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were additionally shown insignificant in predicting workdays lost due to marital 
distress: socio-demographic, parenting, and job demand, which led the 
researchers to conclude that work loss due to marital distress was stable across 
a number of previously considered significant factors.   
As noted earlier, males are the most affected by marital distress. Within 
the male population of their study, Forthofer et al. (1996) evaluated different 
lengths of marital duration. They found marital duration to be the only factor that 
significantly interacted with marital distress. They concluded, based on the 
results of interacting marital distress and marital duration, that men with a marital 
duration of 0–10 years suffer from the greatest effects of marital distress 
(Forthofer et al., 1996).   
In the study by Forthofer et al. (1996), a male with a marital duration of 0–
10 years had a slope coefficient for marital distress of 1.34. The variable marital 
distress was measured in standard deviations from the mean marital distress of 
the population. A male who was married for two years experiencing one standard 
deviation of marital distress greater than the mean missed 1.34 days more of 
work per month than the standard married male worker (Forthofer et al., 1996). 
The measure in this study, marital distress, does not actually track the divorce of 
a couple but only accounts for the distress that is experienced before, during, 
and after a marriage.   
C. PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
Because the practical application in this study looks at divorce instead of 
at marital distress, two standard deviations above normal marital tension were 
used to represent divorce. At two standard deviations, according to the Forthofer 
et al. (1996) study, a male would experience 2.64 days of work loss per month. 
The trauma of a divorce is different for every person, and thus, the severity and 
duration of a divorce’s effect also varies. For the purpose of analysis, four 
months is the average amount of time a male worker continues to experience 
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potential days of work lost for a male with a marital duration of 0–10 years would 
be 10.72 days per worker per four months.   
Using a standard workday of eight hours and a work month of 20 days, the 
male in the aforementioned example will work 13.4% less than the average 
worker per month. Stated another way, this worker will only work 86.6% of the 
time for which he is being paid; effectively, the worker is being paid for more than 
he is producing. Even one standard deviation of marital distress would equate to 
6.7% work loss per month.  
Productivity that is lost can be represented in terms of dollars by using the 
salary of the worker. The military member is not paid by the hour, so when they 
are absent from work or fail to perform assigned tasks, they are essentially being 
paid to do nothing. Stated another way, the military is paying a greater amount 
for less work. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the median pay for 
enlisted personnel with 5 years and 10 years of work experience was $50,000 
and $64,000 in FY2010 dollars (CBO, 2011). Using an average median pay of 
$57,000, an enlisted member experiencing divorce would have been overpaid by 
$2,546 that year.  
In understanding the possible impact of marital distress on workdays lost, 
it is important to note that the days lost due to marital distress are in addition to 
other reasons a worker’s productivity may decrease. Other causes of work-loss 
are illness and lack of sleep, both of which can be increased by marital distress. 
But the employer could change the number of days of work loss expected by 
offering the employee preventive services like counseling or a flexible schedule 
that help him or her to reduce marital tension. In the study by Forthofer et al. 
(1996), the empirical analysis showed that a method of preventive marital 
interventions could decrease the work lost due to marital distress by 0.29 lost 
work days per person per month in the subset to which the effect was applied. 
This would change the number of days of work loss for a male in the process of a 
divorce to 8.4 days instead of 10.72 days. Furthermore, depending on the 
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one standard deviation of marital distress over four months and altogether avoid 
divorce, reducing work lost to 4.2 days instead of 10.72 days. The decrease in 
lost work days is directly correlated to worker productivity. A worker missing 
10.72 days over a four-month period versus a worker missing 4.2 days over the 
same period has the following percent productivity compared to the standard 
worker: 86.6% versus 94.8%.  
 In the military, overall effectiveness is measured through mission 
accomplishment. There is no quantitative metric of singular worker productivity. 
By using the Forthofer et al. (1996) study on workdays lost due to marital distress, 
it is possible to estimate the decrease in productivity that the military suffers due 
to divorces as a result of OIF/OEF. Workdays lost are dependent on the level of 
marital distress and the number of months over which the distress has occurred, 
so the model was calculated with an increase of two standard deviations of 
marital distress over four months, resulting in a coefficient of 10.72 for the 
number of days lost per year. According to the data provided by the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) from September 11, 2001–September 30, 2009, 
9,729 male Navy officers, 19,605 male Navy enlistees, 918 male Marine Corps 
officers, and 7,724 male Marine Corps enlistees have divorced, giving a total of 
37,976 male divorces. Military work lost from divorcing male members is given by 
the following equation:  
 
Military work lost due to marital distress = (10.72 days lost per worker per 
year)*(37,976 workers).  (5) 
 
By virtue of military females’ self-selection into a primarily male-dominated 
occupation, it is possible that the females in the military will deal with conflict and 
marital distress in a similar way to their male counterparts. The number of 
workers affected by marital distress when female divorces are included will 
increase from 37,976 to 47,860. Military work lost from divorcing male and 








Military work lost due to marital distress = (10.72 days lost per worker per 
year)*(47,860 workers)   (6) 
 
Equations 5 and 6 result in 407,103 or 513,059 days of military work lost and 
thus productivity lost due to marital dissolution over the course of eight years, 
respectively. A clear understanding of the amount of work lost is given when the 
number of divorces is considered by year.  
The total number of enlisted male divorces from September 11, 2001–
September 30 was 27,329. Using the same format as Equation 5 and 6, the total 
days of work lost for enlisted male members is 292,967 days. Applying the 
FY2010 median compensation rate, divorce cost the Department of the Navy 
(DoN) $69,579,634 in lost productivity. This is approximately $8.7 million per year.  
If that additional $8.7 million were to remain in the military’s personnel account, 
at the median compensation rate of $57,000, 150 additional enlisted members 
could be funded.  
In 2002, there were 3,441 divorces among male Navy enlisted members. 
Assuming that over the course of a year, each member was expected to work an 
average of 20 days per month and 12 months per year, 825,840 days of work 
should have resulted over the course of a year. However, since these members 
were experiencing marital distress, as evidenced by a change in marital status to 
divorced, they would have worked 36,887 fewer days. The members 
experiencing marital distress lowered the married members’ military productivity 
by 4.5%. Looking at it another way, the 36,887 days of lost work equates to 154 
workers working 240 days per year.  
The results from Chapter V show that a married deployed military member 
has an increased likelihood of divorce. In the unrestricted Marine Corps enlistee 
sample, 1,016 males divorced in 2007 and 582 had been on one or more 
deployments during his marriage. Over 50% of the productivity lost due to 
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common trait between divorce and lost productivity does not suggest that 
deployment causes divorce but it is sufficient to conclude that members who are 
married and deployed suffer from an additional strain. This additional strain not 
only affects the member who is experiencing the marital conflict but also affects 
the entire mission capability of the unit. As mentioned earlier, preventative 
measures such as counseling and flexible work hours were shown by the 
Forthofer et al. (1996) study to decrease work loss due to marital distress. 
Further analysis should be conducted to determine what measures are 
appropriate for deployed and nondeployed military members. It may be the case 
that something as simple as mandatory premarital counseling could give 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In FY2009, the Department of Defense (DoD) recruited 168,900 active 
duty troops—a number that exceeded the 100% recruiting goal by 3% (Tyson, 
2009). The economy and the unemployment rate in FY2009 were credited with 
the extraordinary recruiting achievement. Recruits in FY2009 had a higher level 
of education and higher scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) 
than previous cohorts, suggesting that the Armed Forces had more applicants 
than needed and could choose only the best. High unemployment rates have 
historically been correlated with strong recruiting years (Tyson, 2009).  
To fully take advantage of the number of qualified military applicants 
provided by the FY2009 unemployment rate, the military needs to retain as many 
trained and qualified members as possible. Over 50% of the enlisted members 
past the age of 25 are married—20% more than the equivalent civilian population. 
Therefore, by improving personnel policies that anticipate the needs of married 
Service members, the military can increase retention and increase the return on 
initial recruiting and training investments.  
Several initiatives have been proposed and implemented in recent years 
to reduce the stress on the family. A pilot program allows members to take up to 
three years off. In this program, each month the member is not engaged in active 
service, he or she will owe two additional months of service (Maze, 2008). If a 
member were to take a year off to start a family, he or she would be required to 
return to military service for a minimum of two years following the break. This 
thesis suggests that reducing the frequency of deployments and increasing 
deployment length by a month or two (in order to maintain the same readiness) 
would reduce the stress on the family as measured by divorce rates. Additionally, 
as the economy continues to recover, alternative job options will increase. The 
military’s continued refinement of personnel policies will be an advantage over 
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It is a mistake simply to look at the overall trend of the Navy and Marine 
Corps divorce rates and assume that because the aggregate divorce rate is 
decreasing, there are no underlying issues. Figures 10–13 clearly depict a 
different divorce rate for members who are deployed to OIF/OEF than members 
who are not deployed to OIF/OEF. The results of Chapter V confirm that in the 
general active duty population for the Navy and Marine Corps (i.e., unrestricted 
models), more frequent separation due to deployments increases the probability 
of divorce, while longer deployments do not appear to be a major factor in 
affecting the divorce rate in the unrestricted sample. This analysis confirms the 
hypothesis that an increased OPTEMPO increases the divorce rate. Additionally, 
longer deployments appear to adversely affect the younger Navy and Marine 
Corps enlisted members in their first four years of service and the early stages of 
their marriage.  
In 2007, RAND released a study that looked at the impact of OIF or OEF 
deployment on military marriages. The RAND study used quarterly demographic 
summaries from the first quarter of FY1996 to the last quarter of FY2005 (Karney 
& Crown, 2007). This research used monthly information, more accurately 
capturing when a change in a member’s demographics occurred. Additionally, 
RAND’s analysis used the number of days a member was deployed while 
married, downplaying the stress a member and his or her may family experience 
from multiple deployments. The three models in this thesis consider number of 
days deployed, number of deployments, and both variables jointly. Similar 
divorce rates were found from 2000–2005 between this thesis and the RAND 
study where the data overlapped, validating that similarly information was 
analyzed.  
RAND found that “service record data from the past ten years do not 
demonstrate the high rates of marital dissolution that are predicted by the stress 
hypothesis” (Karney & Crown, 2007, p. xxi). Six of the eight models in this paper 
that only include the number of days a member was deployed support RAND’s 
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found the coefficient for the number of days deployed variable to be generally 
negative or insignificant (with the exception of the restricted enlistee samples). 
However, unlike the RAND study, when both number of deployments, and or 
number of deployments and length of deployments, were controlled for a positive 
and significant impact was generally found on the likelihood of a member 
divorcing.   
Research has shown that a factor in divorce is the ability of the divorce-
initiating spouse to feel financially stable after the divorce. With the 
unemployment rate vacillating between 9–10% over the last several years, 
spouses with no job prospects will be more inclined to stay married. This is not to 
say that spouses are staying in destructive marriages; rather, it is to say that the 
role conflict between work and family is lessened because of economic factors. 
Pittman’s (1994) research suggested that the more aligned the military member’s 
job was with family goals, such as financial stability (e.g., providing food and 
shelter), the less marital conflict the spouse had with increased time spent at 
work. As future OPTEMPO decisions are made, it is critical to understand how 
the decision to send units on a deployment over six to seven months may affect 
work-family conflict in the context of the current economic factors. Understanding 
that increased marital conflict can negatively affect the military through lower 
military productivity, decreased interest in the military, and a member’s departure 
from the Service (decreasing the military’s ROI) is key when making policy 
decisions that determine the length and frequency of deployments.  
There are a number of questions that this research still leaves 
unanswered. One of the biggest unanswered issues is that the deployment 
variables only captured deployments to OIF/OEF. Using unit-identifying codes 
(UIC), more complete data could be paired to each member, enabling the models 
to account for all the time spent away from family. Additionally, there are 
unobservable factors that this research could not account for. A large 
unobservable factor is spouse information. Although the data did account for dual 
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also employed or what the characteristics for that employment were. Future 
research that uses DMDC data in conjunction with a survey may capture more 
unobservable factors.  
This research looked only at the end state of a marriage; however, it may 
be the case that members are entering into a marriage shortly before deploying. 
Accounting for the length of the marriage may cover some of this effect, but a 
more accurate measure of the time married couples were able to spend together 
would be the number of days married and not deployed. Finally, it is the practice 
of all Services to allow a member to return home for rest and relaxation (R&R) if 
they are deployed for greater than 365 days. A similar study determining if the 
restorative properties of R&R actually outweigh the potential work-family strain 
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APPENDIX A. UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE OF NAVY OFFICERS 
MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1 to 90 days deployed 
while married 
-0.032***   
 (0.007)   
91 to 180 days 
deployed while married 
-0.084***   
 (0.005)   
181 to 365 days 
deployed while married 
-0.128***   
 (0.004)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while married 
-0.153***   
 (0.003)   
Number of months 
deployed while married 
  -0.030*** 
   (0.001) 
1 deployment while 
married 
 -0.003 0.142*** 
  (0.005) (0.008) 
Greater than 1 
deployment while 
married 
 -0.074***  
  (0.008)  
2 deployments while 
married 
  0.224*** 
   (0.026) 
3 deployments while 
married 
  0.185*** 
   (0.042) 
Greater than 3 
deployments while 
married 
  0.105*** 
   (0.036) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
-0.020 -0.092*** -0.056*** 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.062*** -0.047*** 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) 
Deployed to the Middle 
East (other than 
Afghanistan and Iraq) 
0.053*** -0.037*** -0.008 
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Female 0.000 0.006 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Dependent quantity -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.034*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married to military 
spouse 
-0.048*** -0.052*** -0.050*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Divorced prior to 
marriage 
0.007 0.008 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Never married prior to 
marriage 
-0.033*** -0.035*** -0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Widow/Widower prior 
to marriage 
-0.068* -0.064 -0.070* 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.039) 
W01–W05 when 
married 
0.116*** 0.120*** 0.111*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
O1–O3 when married 0.042*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
O4–O5 when married 0.009 0.010 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Faith -0.160*** -0.162*** -0.155*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Black 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander 
0.081* 0.082** 0.074* 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
Asian 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
American 
Indian/Alaskan Native 
0.078*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
SWO -0.043*** -0.054*** -0.047*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SUB -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.085*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SpecWar -0.005 -0.011 -0.007 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
SpecOps 0.000 -0.010 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
HR -0.113*** -0.109*** -0.106*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
Aviation -0.079*** -0.089*** -0.082*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
EOD -0.015** -0.015** -0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
PAO 0.049** 0.055*** 0.047** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
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 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Medical -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.045*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Chaplain -0.030*** -0.045*** -0.033*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
JAG -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.059*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Supply 0.005 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Entry year 1956 0.839*** 0.834*** 0.844*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1959 0.839*** 0.834*** 0.844*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1960 0.840*** 0.835*** 0.845*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1961 0.841*** 0.836*** 0.846*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1962 0.842*** 0.837*** 0.846*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1963 0.842*** 0.838*** 0.847*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1964 0.845*** 0.840*** 0.849*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1965 0.847*** 0.842*** 0.851*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1966 0.851*** 0.847*** 0.856*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1967 0.852*** 0.847*** 0.857*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1968 0.857*** 0.853*** 0.862*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1969 0.855*** 0.851*** 0.860*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1970 0.858*** 0.853*** 0.862*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1971 0.858*** 0.853*** 0.862*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1972 0.858*** 0.854*** 0.862*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1973 0.858*** 0.854*** 0.863*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1974 0.859*** 0.855*** 0.863*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1975 0.861*** 0.857*** 0.865*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1976 0.861*** 0.857*** 0.866*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1977 0.861*** 0.857*** 0.866*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1978 0.864*** 0.860*** 0.869*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1979 0.864*** 0.860*** 0.869*** 
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Entry year 1980 0.871*** 0.867*** 0.875*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1981 0.873*** 0.869*** 0.877*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1982 0.873*** 0.869*** 0.877*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1983 0.876*** 0.872*** 0.880*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1984 0.877*** 0.873*** 0.881*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1985 0.883*** 0.879*** 0.887*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1986 0.886*** 0.882*** 0.889*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1987 0.884*** 0.880*** 0.888*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1988 0.884*** 0.880*** 0.888*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1989 0.886*** 0.882*** 0.890*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1990 0.880*** 0.876*** 0.884*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1991 0.876*** 0.872*** 0.880*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1992 0.872*** 0.868*** 0.876*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1993 0.877*** 0.873*** 0.881*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1994 0.876*** 0.872*** 0.880*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1995 0.877*** 0.873*** 0.881*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1996 0.880*** 0.876*** 0.884*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1997 0.881*** 0.876*** 0.884*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1998 0.878*** 0.874*** 0.882*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 1999 0.878*** 0.874*** 0.882*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 2000 0.874*** 0.869*** 0.877*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Entry year 2001 0.866*** 0.861*** 0.870*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 2002 0.861*** 0.857*** 0.866*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 2003 0.853*** 0.848*** 0.857*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 2004 0.847*** 0.842*** 0.851*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 2005 0.843*** 0.838*** 0.848*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 2007 0.840*** 0.836*** 0.845*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 2008 0.840*** 0.835*** 0.845*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 2009 0.840*** 0.835*** 0.844*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 61775 61775 61775 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX B. RESTRICTED SAMPLE OF NAVY OFFICERS 
MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1 to 90 days deployed 
while married 
0.022   
 (0.022)   
91 to 180 days 
deployed while married 
0.021   
 (0.019)   
181 to 365 days 
deployed while married 
0.006   
 (0.013)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while married 
0.016   
 (0.026)   
Number of months 
deployed while married 
  -0.003* 
   (0.001) 
1 deployment while 
married 
 0.026** 0.042*** 
  (0.012) (0.015) 
Greater than 1 
deployment while 
married 
 0.039 0.091 
  (0.046) (0.074) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
0.004 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.007 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) 
Deployed to the Middle 
East (other than 
Afghanistan and Iraq) 
0.023 0.013 0.016 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) 
Control Variables 
Female 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Age at the time of 
marriage 
0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years married -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.099*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Dependent quantity -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 








 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Divorced prior to 
marriage 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) 
Never married prior to 
marriage 
-0.019 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
O1–O3 when married 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
O4–O5 when married 0.956*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) 
Faith -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Black -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander 
-0.010 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.051) (0.054) (0.054) 
Asian 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
American 
Indian/Alaskan Native 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.011 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
SWO -0.013 -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
SUB -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
SpecWar -0.021 -0.023 -0.024 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.023) 
HR -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Aviation -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
EOD -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
PAO -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.042) 
Merchant Marine 0.046 0.055 0.053 
 (0.064) (0.069) (0.068) 
Medical -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Chaplain 0.033 0.027 0.036 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.046) 
JAG -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Supply -0.016 -0.017 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Married year 2001 -0.023 -0.022 -0.021 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Married year 2002 -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.048*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
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 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Married year 2004 -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.142*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Married year 2005 -0.167*** -0.167*** -0.163*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Married year 2006 -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.184*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Married year 2007 -0.188*** -0.187*** -0.183*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Married year 2008 -0.203*** -0.202*** -0.198*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Entry year 2001 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.183*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) 
Entry year 2002 0.488*** 0.484*** 0.475*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Entry year 2003 0.921*** 0.919*** 0.916*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) 
Entry year 2004 0.983*** 0.983*** 0.983*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Years as an officer 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.092*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Observations 3579 3579 3579 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX C. UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE OF NAVY ENLISTEES 
MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1 to 90 days deployed 
while married 
-0.007   
 (0.005)   
91 to 180 days 
deployed while married 
-0.015***   
 (0.004)   
181 to 365 days 
deployed while married 
-0.041***   
 (0.003)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while married 
-0.078***   
 (0.005)   
Number of months 
deployed while married 
  -0.012*** 
   (0.001) 
1 deployment while 
married 
 0.005* 0.072*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
Greater than 1 
deployment while 
married 
 -0.038***  
  (0.008)  
2 deployments while 
married 
  0.070*** 
   (0.016) 
3 deployments while 
married 
  0.087*** 
   (0.031) 
Greater than 3 
deployments while 
married 
  0.056* 
   (0.029) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
-0.047*** -0.071*** -0.050*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Deployed to Iraq -0.015*** -0.050*** -0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Deployed to the Middle 
East (other than 
Afghanistan and Iraq) 
-0.027*** -0.058*** -0.037*** 
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Female 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dependent quantity -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married to military 
spouse 
-0.032*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Divorced prior to 
marriage 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Never married prior to 
marriage 
-0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Widow/Widower prior 
to marriage 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
E1–E3 when married 0.015*** 0.013** 0.015*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
E4–E6 when married 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Faith 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Black 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander 
0.018 0.017 0.018 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Asian 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
American 
Indian/Alaskan Native 
0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Construction 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Marine engineering -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ship maintenance 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Aviation ground 
support 
-0.010*** -0.009** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Logistics and 
administration 
0.030*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Health care -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cryptology 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ordnance 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Communications 
systems 
-0.015** -0.016** -0.015** 
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Weapons system and 
control 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1958  0.032  
  (0.127)  
Entry year 1959 -0.028  -0.027 
 (0.096)  (0.096) 
Entry year 1960 0.055 0.094 0.056 
 (0.127) (0.085) (0.127) 
Entry year 1961 0.015 0.050 0.015 
 (0.110) (0.075) (0.110) 
Entry year 1962 0.064 0.103 0.064 
 (0.128) (0.082) (0.128) 
Entry year 1963 0.043 0.080 0.043 
 (0.120) (0.078) (0.120) 
Entry year 1964 0.076 0.117 0.075 
 (0.130) (0.081) (0.130) 
Entry year 1965 0.076 0.117 0.075 
 (0.130) (0.079) (0.129) 
Entry year 1966 0.091 0.133 0.090 
 (0.134) (0.081) (0.133) 
Entry year 1967 0.093 0.135* 0.090 
 (0.135) (0.082) (0.134) 
Entry year 1968 0.081 0.122 0.079 
 (0.130) (0.079) (0.129) 
Entry year 1969 0.111 0.155* 0.111 
 (0.139) (0.083) (0.139) 
Entry year 1970 0.106 0.149* 0.104 
 (0.138) (0.083) (0.137) 
Entry year 1971 0.170 0.217** 0.169 
 (0.154) (0.089) (0.153) 
Entry year 1972 0.150 0.195** 0.150 
 (0.149) (0.087) (0.149) 
Entry year 1973 0.207 0.256*** 0.205 
 (0.161) (0.092) (0.160) 
Entry year 1974 0.191 0.240*** 0.189 
 (0.157) (0.090) (0.157) 
Entry year 1975 0.223 0.273*** 0.221 
 (0.163) (0.092) (0.162) 
Entry year 1976 0.262 0.312*** 0.259 
 (0.167) (0.093) (0.166) 
Entry year 1977 0.300* 0.351*** 0.298* 
 (0.170) (0.094) (0.170) 
Entry year 1978 0.322* 0.373*** 0.319* 
 (0.171) (0.094) (0.171) 
Entry year 1979 0.363** 0.413*** 0.360** 
 (0.172) (0.092) (0.172) 
Entry year 1980 0.408** 0.457*** 0.405** 
 (0.170) (0.090) (0.170) 
Entry year 1981 0.419** 0.467*** 0.415** 
 (0.169) (0.089) (0.170) 
Entry year 1982 0.450*** 0.497*** 0.446*** 
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Entry year 1983 0.425** 0.473*** 0.422** 
 (0.169) (0.089) (0.169) 
Entry year 1984 0.440*** 0.487*** 0.435*** 
 (0.167) (0.088) (0.168) 
Entry year 1985 0.444*** 0.491*** 0.440*** 
 (0.167) (0.088) (0.168) 
Entry year 1986 0.431** 0.479*** 0.428** 
 (0.168) (0.088) (0.168) 
Entry year 1987 0.422** 0.469*** 0.418** 
 (0.168) (0.089) (0.169) 
Entry year 1988 0.409** 0.458*** 0.406** 
 (0.169) (0.090) (0.169) 
Entry year 1989 0.414** 0.463*** 0.411** 
 (0.169) (0.089) (0.169) 
Entry year 1990 0.390** 0.440*** 0.388** 
 (0.170) (0.090) (0.170) 
Entry year 1991 0.391** 0.442*** 0.388** 
 (0.170) (0.090) (0.170) 
Entry year 1992 0.355** 0.406*** 0.353** 
 (0.171) (0.092) (0.170) 
Entry year 1993 0.287* 0.338*** 0.286* 
 (0.167) (0.092) (0.167) 
Entry year 1994 0.244 0.294*** 0.244 
 (0.161) (0.090) (0.161) 
Entry year 1995 0.285* 0.337*** 0.285* 
 (0.165) (0.091) (0.165) 
Entry year 1996 0.300* 0.353*** 0.300* 
 (0.167) (0.091) (0.166) 
Entry year 1997 0.301* 0.352*** 0.299* 
 (0.167) (0.091) (0.166) 
Entry year 1998 0.282* 0.330*** 0.278* 
 (0.166) (0.091) (0.165) 
Entry year 1999 0.276* 0.321*** 0.271* 
 (0.164) (0.090) (0.164) 
Entry year 2000 0.260 0.304*** 0.254 
 (0.162) (0.089) (0.161) 
Entry year 2001 0.253 0.297*** 0.247 
 (0.161) (0.089) (0.160) 
Entry year 2002 0.245 0.288*** 0.238 
 (0.160) (0.089) (0.159) 
Entry year 2003 0.209 0.248*** 0.200 
 (0.156) (0.087) (0.155) 
Entry year 2004 0.193 0.234*** 0.186 
 (0.155) (0.087) (0.154) 
Entry year 2005 0.160 0.205** 0.155 
 (0.150) (0.086) (0.149) 
Entry year 2006 0.121 0.172** 0.120 
 (0.141) (0.084) (0.141) 
Entry year 2007 0.164 0.219** 0.162 
 (0.152) (0.089) (0.151) 
Entry year 2008 0.106 0.158* 0.108 
 (0.138) (0.084) (0.139) 
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 (0.160) (0.095) (0.159) 
Observations 163525 163525 163525 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX D. RESTRICTED SAMPLE OF NAVY ENLISTEES 
MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1 to 90 days deployed 
while married 
-0.001   
 (0.006)   
91 to 180 days 
deployed while married 
0.000   
 (0.005)   
181 to 365 days 
deployed while married 
0.012**   
 (0.005)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while married 
0.010   
 (0.014)   
Number of months 
deployed while married 
  0.000 
   (0.001) 
1 deployment while 
married 
 0.008** 0.007 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
Greater than 1 
deployment while 
married 
 0.040 0.039 
  (0.030) (0.033) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
-0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Deployed to the Middle 
East (other than 
Afghanistan and Iraq) 
0.017 0.015 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Control Variables 
Female 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age at the time of 
marriage 
-0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of years 
married 
-0.097*** -0.097*** -0.098*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Dependent quantity -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
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Married to military 
spouse 
-0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Divorced prior to 
marriage 
0.033 0.033 0.033 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Never married prior to 
marriage 
-0.033** -0.034** -0.034** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
E1–E3 when married 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
E4–E6 when married 0.726*** 0.726*** 0.726*** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
Faith 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Black -0.006* -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander 
0.009 0.010 0.010 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Asian -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
American 
Indian/Alaskan Native 
0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Construction 0.018 0.021 0.021 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Marine engineering -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ship maintenance -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Aviation ground 
support 
-0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Logistics and 
administration 
-0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Health care 0.032 0.034 0.034 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Cryptology -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ordnance -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Communications 
systems 
-0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Weapons system and 
control 
0.011 0.012 0.012 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Married year 2001 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married year 2003 -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.127*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Married year 2004 -0.231*** -0.230*** -0.230*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Married year 2005 -0.288*** -0.288*** -0.288*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Married year 2006 -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.174*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Married year 2007 -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Married year 2008 -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married year 2009 -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 2001 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Entry year 2002 0.762*** 0.762*** 0.762*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Entry year 2003 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.988*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 2004 0.998*** 0.998*** 0.998*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Entry year 2005 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 9193 9193 9193 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX E. UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE OF MARINE CORPS 
OFFICERS MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1 to 90 days deployed while 
married 
0.016   
 (0.015)   
91 to 180 days deployed 
while married 
-0.005   
 (0.009)   
181 to 365 days deployed 
while married 
-0.018***   
 (0.006)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while married 
-0.016**   
 (0.007)   
Number of months deployed 
while married 
  -0.001*** 
   (0.000) 
1 deployment while married  0.010 0.024*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Greater than 1 deployment 
while married 
 -0.012  
  (0.015)  
2 deployments while married   0.009 
   (0.022) 
3 deployments while married   -0.034 
   (0.029) 
Greater than 3 deployments 
while married 
  0.001 
   (0.063) 
Deployed to Afghanistan -0.012 -0.022** -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Deployed to Iraq -0.005 -0.020*** -0.013** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Deployed to the Middle East 
(other than Afghanistan and 
Iraq) 
-0.001 -0.014* -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
Control Variables 
Female 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Dependent quantity 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Married to military spouse 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 
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Divorced prior to marriage -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Never married prior to 
marriage 
-0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Missing married information 
prior to marriage 
0.023 0.024 0.024 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
W01–W05 when married -0.001 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
O1–O3 when married 0.014 0.015 0.012 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
O4–O5 when married -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Faith -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Black 0.026** 0.027** 0.026** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 0.212*** 0.205*** 0.200*** 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) 
Asian -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
American Indian/Alaskan 
Native 
0.018 0.018 0.019 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Combat arms -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Combat support 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Combat service support -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Aviation -0.014* -0.013* -0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Entry year 1961 0.933*** 0.932*** 0.933*** 
 (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) 
Entry year 1966 0.936*** 0.935*** 0.936*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) 
Entry year 1967 0.924*** 0.923*** 0.924*** 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) 
Entry year 1968 0.922*** 0.922*** 0.922*** 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.035) 
Entry year 1969 0.933*** 0.932*** 0.933*** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 
Entry year 1970 0.933*** 0.933*** 0.933*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) 
Entry year 1971 0.940*** 0.940*** 0.941*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Entry year 1972 0.940*** 0.940*** 0.941*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry year 1973 0.942*** 0.942*** 0.943*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
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 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1975 0.944*** 0.944*** 0.945*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1976 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.947*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1977 0.948*** 0.948*** 0.949*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1978 0.949*** 0.949*** 0.950*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1979 0.949*** 0.949*** 0.950*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1980 0.948*** 0.947*** 0.948*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1981 0.951*** 0.951*** 0.952*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1982 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.954*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1983 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1984 0.951*** 0.950*** 0.951*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1985 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.951*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1986 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.956*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1987 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.955*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1988 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.955*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1989 0.953*** 0.952*** 0.953*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1990 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1991 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.955*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1992 0.956*** 0.956*** 0.956*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1993 0.956*** 0.955*** 0.956*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1994 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.955*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1995 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Entry year 1996 0.954*** 0.953*** 0.954*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1997 0.951*** 0.950*** 0.951*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1998 0.952*** 0.952*** 0.952*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1999 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 2000 0.949*** 0.948*** 0.949*** 
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Entry year 2001 0.944*** 0.944*** 0.944*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Entry year 2002 0.944*** 0.943*** 0.944*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Entry year 2003 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.946*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Entry year 2004 0.941*** 0.941*** 0.941*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
Entry year 2005 0.939*** 0.938*** 0.939*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Entry year 2006 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) 
Entry year 2009 0.936*** 0.936*** 0.937*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 13111 13111 13111 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX F. RESTRICTED SAMPLE OF MARINE CORPS 
OFFICERS MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 










1 to 90 days deployed while 
married 
-0.001   
 (0.001)   
181 to 365 days deployed 
while married 
-0.003   
 (0.005)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed 
-0.003   
 (0.005)   
Number of months deployed 
while married 
  -0.000 
   (0.000) 
1 deployment while married  0.000 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.001) 
Deployed to Afghanistan 0.314 0.158 0.364 
 (0.234) (0.151) (0.296) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.015 0.003 0.008 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.014) 
Deployed to the Middle East 
(other than Afghanistan and 
Iraq) 
0.010 0.001 0.005 
 (0.022) (0.006) (0.013) 
Control Variables 
Female 0.017 0.025 0.006 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.015) 
Age at time of marriage -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Years married -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) 
Dependent quantity 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Married to military spouse 0.034 0.062 0.048 
 (0.052) (0.071) (0.068) 
Never married prior to 
marriage 
0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
Faith 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Asian -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
American Indian/Alaskan 
Native 
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 (0.031) (0.018) (0.013) 
Combat arms -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Combat support -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Combat service support -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
Aviation -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Married year 2001 0.646 0.865 0.629*** 
 (1.069) (0.571) (0.225) 
Married year 2002 0.483 0.607 0.427 
 (0.975) (0.844) (0.574) 
Married year 2003 0.056 0.151 0.060 
 (0.247) (0.474) (0.190) 
Married year 2004 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.029) (0.001) 
Married year 2005 -0.001 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.023) (0.001) 
Married year 2006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) 
Married year 2007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) 
Entry year 2001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Entry year 2002 0.026 0.030 0.024 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) 
Entry year 2003 0.078 0.115 0.074 
 (0.142) (0.153) (0.142) 
Observations 284 289 289 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX G. UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE OF MARINE CORPS 
ENLISTEES MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 Model focused on 
number of days 
deployed 
(length) 










1 to 90 days deployed while 
married 
0.003   
 (0.005)   
91 to 180 days deployed 
while married 
-0.014***   
 (0.003)   
181 to 365 days deployed 
while married 
-0.013***   
 (0.003)   
Greater than 365 days 
deployed while married 
-0.028***   
 (0.003)   
Number of months deployed 
while married 
  -0.002*** 
   (0.000) 
1 deployment while married  0.008*** 0.022*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Greater than 1 deployment 
while married 
 0.005  
  (0.009)  
2 deployments while married   0.036*** 
   (0.012) 
3 deployments while married   0.056 
   (0.038) 
Greater than 3 deployments 
while married 
  0.104 
   (0.105) 
Deployed to Afghanistan 0.023** 0.003 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.024*** 0.003 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Deployed to the Middle East 
(other than Afghanistan and 
Iraq) 
0.000 -0.016*** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Control Variables 
Female 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dependent quantity -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married to military spouse 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
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Divorced prior to marriage 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Never married prior to 
marriage 
-0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Widow/Widower prior to 
marriage 
-0.016 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
E1–E3 when married 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
E4–E6 when married 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Faith -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Black 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 0.012 0.011 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Asian 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
American Indian/Alaskan –
Native 
0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Combat arms -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Combat support -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Combat service support -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Aviation -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.046*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1960 0.918*** 0.918*** 0.918*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1965 0.904*** 0.904*** 0.904*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
Entry year 1966 0.905*** 0.905*** 0.905*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
Entry year 1967 0.909*** 0.909*** 0.909*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Entry year 1968 0.905*** 0.906*** 0.906*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
Entry year 1969 0.919*** 0.919*** 0.920*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Entry year 1972 0.919*** 0.919*** 0.919*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Entry year 1973 0.923*** 0.923*** 0.923*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1974 0.922*** 0.922*** 0.922*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year1975 0.923*** 0.923*** 0.923*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
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 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1977 0.924*** 0.923*** 0.924*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Entry year 1978 0.924*** 0.924*** 0.925*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1979 0.925*** 0.925*** 0.925*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1980 0.925*** 0.925*** 0.925*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1981 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1982 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.927*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1983 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1984 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.927*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1985 0.927*** 0.926*** 0.927*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1986 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.927*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1987 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.927*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1988 0.928*** 0.928*** 0.928*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1989 0.929*** 0.928*** 0.929*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1990 0.929*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1991 0.929*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1992 0.933*** 0.933*** 0.933*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1993 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.946*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1994 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1995 0.957*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1996 0.960*** 0.960*** 0.960*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1997 0.961*** 0.961*** 0.961*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1998 0.962*** 0.962*** 0.962*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1999 0.962*** 0.962*** 0.962*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2000 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2001 0.966*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2002 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 
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Entry year 2003 0.960*** 0.959*** 0.959*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Entry year 2004 0.951*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2005 0.939*** 0.939*** 0.939*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 2006 0.928*** 0.928*** 0.928*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Entry year 2007 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.927*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 2008 0.925*** 0.925*** 0.925*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 2009 0.923*** 0.923*** 0.923*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Observations 108074 108074 108074 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX H. RESTRICTED SAMPLE OF MARINE CORPS 
ENLISTEES MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 Model focused 
on number of days 
deployed 
Model focused 









1 to 90 days deployed while 
married 
0.003   
 (0.004)   
91 to 180 days deployed while 
married 
0.005**   
 (0.003)   
181 to 365 days deployed while 
married 
0.005**   
 (0.002)   
Greater than 365 days deployed 
while married 
0.009**   
 (0.004)   
Number of months deployed 
while married 
  -0.000 
   (0.000) 
1 deployment while married  0.005*** 0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Greater than 1 deployment 
while married 
 0.003 0.004 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
Deployed to Afghanistan 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Deployed to the Middle East 
(other than Afghanistan and 
Iraq) 
0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Control Variables 
Female 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age at time of marriage -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years married -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dependent quantity 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married to military spouse 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Divorced prior to marriage -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
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 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
E4–E6 when married -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Faith -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Black 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asian 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Combat arms -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Combat support -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Combat service support -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Aviation -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married year 2001 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married year 2002 -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Married year 2003 -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Married year 2004 -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.113*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Married year 2005 -0.181*** -0.180*** -0.180*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Married year 2006 -0.146*** -0.145*** -0.145*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Married year 2007 -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Married year 2008 -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 2001 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Entry year 2002 0.794*** 0.794*** 0.794*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Entry year 2003 0.991*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 2004 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Entry year 2005 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 16330 16330 16330 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX I. UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE OF NAVY OFFICERS 
THIRD MODEL MARGINAL EFFECTS/ROBUSTNESS  


















































-0.029*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1 deployment 
while married 
0.141*** 0.133*** 0.148*** 0.145*** 0.148*** 0.137*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
2 deployments 
while married 
0.225*** 0.211*** 0.252*** 0.228*** 0.250*** 0.234*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
3 deployments 
while married 
0.180*** 0.174*** 0.218*** 0.185*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) 
Greater than 3 
deployments while 
married 
0.100*** 0.092*** 0.136*** 0.102*** 0.132*** 0.127*** 





-0.050*** -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.049*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.016* 0.016 0.016* 0.014 0.017* 0.016* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Deployed to the 
Middle East (other 
than Afghanistan 
and Iraq) 
-0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Control Variables 
Female 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.011** 0.008* 0.008* 





-0.024*** -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 




-0.053*** -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Divorced prior to 
marriage 
0.006 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
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prior to marriage 0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Widow/Widower 
prior to marriage 
-0.069* -0.071* -0.061 -0.064* -0.062 -0.065* 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) 
W01–W05 when 
married 
0.111*** 0.128***  0.101***   
 (0.021) (0.022)  (0.021)   
O1–O3 when 
married 
0.045*** 0.059***  0.038***   
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007)   
O4–O5 when 
married 
0.015** 0.018***  0.013*   
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007)   
Faith -0.153*** -
0.153*** 
-0.145*** -0.146*** -0.145*** -0.145*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Black 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander 
0.077* 0.067* 0.068* 0.072* 0.066* 0.052 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037) 
Asian 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 




0.077*** 0.078*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
SWO -0.046*** -
0.044*** 
-0.041***    
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)    
SUB -0.082*** -
0.081*** 
-0.078***    
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
SpecWar -0.001 0.004 -0.001    
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)    
SpecOps 0.005 0.007 0.010    
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)    
HR -0.097*** -
0.093*** 
-0.101***    
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)    
Aviation -0.078*** -
0.077*** 
-0.070***    
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
EOD -0.017*** -
0.019*** 
-0.017***    
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
PAO 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.050***    
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)    
Merchant Marine -0.080*** -
0.073*** 
-0.066***    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    








 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Chaplain -0.032*** -
0.032*** 
-0.024**    
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
JAG -0.054*** -
0.053*** 
-0.040***    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    
Supply 0.002 0.003 0.003    
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
Entry year 1956 0.135 0.104 0.221 0.172 0.228 0.176 
 (0.233) (0.221) (0.255) (0.243) (0.256) (0.244) 
Entry year 1959 -0.115*** -
0.125*** 
-0.085 -0.105*** -0.084 -0.105*** 
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.053) (0.041) (0.053) (0.037) 
Entry year 1960 -0.110*** -
0.120*** 
-0.079** -0.100*** -0.078** -0.099*** 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.034) (0.027) (0.035) (0.025) 
Entry year 1961 -0.101*** -
0.112*** 
-0.073*** -0.092*** -0.073*** -0.093*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028) (0.021) 
Entry year 1962 -0.109*** -
0.119*** 
-0.081*** -0.100*** -0.080*** -0.099*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.023) (0.017) 
Entry year 1963 -0.130*** -
0.136*** 
-0.107*** -0.122*** -0.106*** -0.119*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
Entry year 1964 -0.074*** -
0.089*** 
-0.033 -0.064*** -0.032 -0.060*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) 
Entry year 1965 -0.083*** -
0.097*** 
-0.048*** -0.075*** -0.048*** -0.074*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) 
Entry year 1966 -0.063*** -
0.080*** 
-0.023 -0.053*** -0.022 -0.054*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) 
Entry year 1967 -0.055*** -
0.073*** 
-0.012 -0.044*** -0.011 -0.045*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Entry year 1968 -0.074*** -
0.089*** 
-0.035*** -0.064*** -0.035** -0.062*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
Entry year 1969 -0.042*** -
0.061*** 
0.002 -0.031** 0.004 -0.032** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) 
Entry year 1970 -0.036*** -
0.056*** 
0.010 -0.025* 0.011 -0.025* 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) 
Entry year 1971 -0.020 -
0.041*** 
0.026 -0.010 0.027* -0.010 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) 
Entry year 1972 0.003 -0.020 0.053*** 0.014 0.054*** 0.012 
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Entry year 1973 0.004 -0.018 0.052*** 0.014 0.052*** 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
Entry year 1974 0.025 0.001 0.076*** 0.036** 0.078*** 0.035** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
Entry year 1975 0.069*** 0.043*** 0.125*** 0.081*** 0.126*** 0.082*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Entry year 1976 0.075*** 0.047*** 0.131*** 0.087*** 0.133*** 0.084*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Entry year 1977 0.056*** 0.031** 0.112*** 0.068*** 0.113*** 0.070*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
Entry year 1978 0.112*** 0.086*** 0.172*** 0.125*** 0.173*** 0.129*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Entry year 1979 0.106*** 0.080*** 0.164*** 0.116*** 0.165*** 0.122*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Entry year 1980 0.117*** 0.093*** 0.175*** 0.129*** 0.176*** 0.137*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Entry year 1981 0.133*** 0.110*** 0.192*** 0.147*** 0.194*** 0.158*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Entry year 1982 0.155*** 0.131*** 0.208*** 0.167*** 0.211*** 0.173*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Entry year 1983 0.177*** 0.155*** 0.227*** 0.188*** 0.230*** 0.195*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Entry year 1984 0.209*** 0.188*** 0.256*** 0.221*** 0.259*** 0.225*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Entry year 1985 0.216*** 0.195*** 0.264*** 0.227*** 0.266*** 0.233*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Entry year 1986 0.209*** 0.189*** 0.249*** 0.218*** 0.252*** 0.223*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Entry year 1987 0.203*** 0.184*** 0.239*** 0.212*** 0.241*** 0.215*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Entry year 1988 0.217*** 0.201*** 0.254*** 0.227*** 0.257*** 0.235*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Entry year 1989 0.178*** 0.166*** 0.207*** 0.182*** 0.208*** 0.192*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Entry year 1990 0.140*** 0.131*** 0.154*** 0.144*** 0.157*** 0.145*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Entry year 1991 0.128*** 0.120*** 0.135*** 0.126*** 0.137*** 0.128*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Entry year 1992 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.129*** 0.122*** 0.129*** 0.125*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Entry year 1993 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.118*** 0.112*** 0.120*** 0.111*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Entry year 1994 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.059*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Entry year 1995 0.042*** 0.032*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.034*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Entry year 1996 0.060*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.066*** 0.051*** 0.033*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Entry year 1997 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.064*** 0.045*** 0.030** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Entry year 1998 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.038*** 0.058*** 0.040*** 0.035*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
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 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
Entry year 2000 0.012 0.001 -0.007 0.027** -0.006 -0.027*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) 
Entry year 2001 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.029** 0.071*** 0.030** 0.010 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) 
Entry year 2002 -0.002 -0.017 -0.019 0.015 -0.019 -0.044*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) 
Entry year 2003 0.016 -0.006 -0.005 0.032* -0.004 -0.039*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) 
Entry year 2004 -0.009 -0.034* -0.028 0.008 -0.027 -0.065*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) 
Entry year 2005 0.006 -0.017 -0.013 0.029 -0.009 -0.045** 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.026) (0.021) 
Entry year 2006 0.023 -0.007 0.004 0.047 0.008 -0.039 
 (0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.040) (0.034) (0.027) 
Entry year 2007 -0.101*** -
0.115*** 
-0.102*** -0.088*** -0.101*** -0.119*** 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019) (0.012) 
Entry year 2008 -0.057 -0.077** -0.063* -0.039 -0.060* -0.090*** 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.033) (0.040) (0.034) (0.023) 
Entry year 2009 -0.090** -
0.102*** 
-0.089*** -0.073* -0.088*** -0.106*** 
 (0.036) (0.030) (0.032) (0.040) (0.033) (0.023) 
Left sample  -
0.052*** 
   -0.081*** 
  (0.003)    (0.003) 
SWO last 
observation 
   -0.046*** -0.042*** -0.040*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SUB last 
observation 
   -0.083*** -0.079*** -0.079*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SpecWar last 
observation 
   -0.002 -0.003 0.005 
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
SpecOps last 
observation 
   0.003 0.011 0.014 
    (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
HR last 
observation 
   -0.094*** -0.091*** -0.090*** 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Aviation last 
observation 
   -0.081*** -0.072*** -0.070*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
EOD last 
observation 
   -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.030*** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
PAO last 
observation 
   0.032* 0.033* 0.032* 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Merchant marine 
last observation 
   -0.079*** -0.071*** -0.060*** 









   -0.139*** -0.133*** -0.134*** 
    (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) 
Medical last 
observation 
   -0.052*** -0.041*** -0.034*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Chaplain last 
observation 
   -0.034*** -0.028*** -0.027*** 
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
JAG last 
observation 
   -0.063*** -0.046*** -0.045*** 
    (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Supply last 
observation 
   -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
W01–W05 last 
observation 
  0.120***  0.115*** 0.145*** 
   (0.021)  (0.021) (0.022) 
O1–O3 last 
observation 
  0.139***  0.136*** 0.175*** 
   (0.007)  (0.007) (0.008) 
O4–O5 last 
observation 
  0.024***  0.023*** 0.032*** 
   (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 65003 65003 64395 64399 64399 64399 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX J. UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE OF NAVY ENLISTEES 
















































-0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1 deployment 
while married 
0.072*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
2 deployments 
while married 
0.076*** 0.072*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
3 deployments 
while married 
0.090*** 0.082*** 0.099*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.092*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Greater than 3 
deployments 
while married 
0.070** 0.055** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.088*** 0.072** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
-0.051*** -0.065*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.060*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
Deployed to Iraq -0.027*** -0.042*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.041*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 





-0.037*** -0.051*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.051*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Control Variables 
Female 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Dependent 
quantity 
-0.023*** -0.025*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married to military 
spouse 
-0.034*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Divorced prior to 
marriage 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 








prior to marriage 
-0.041*** -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Widow/Widower 
prior to marriage 
0.007 0.003 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.011 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
E1–E3 when 
married 
0.015*** 0.030***  0.025***   
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005)   
E4–E6 when 
married 
0.015*** 0.025***  0.011***   
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)   
Faith 0.056*** 0.064*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.057*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Black 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander 
0.011 0.003 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Asian 0.074*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.060*** 




0.032*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Construction 0.002 0.004 -0.007*    
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Marine 
engineering 
-0.017*** -0.015*** -0.024***    
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Ship maintenance 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.012***    
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Aviation ground 
support 
-0.010*** -0.012*** -0.016***    
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Logistics and 
administration 
0.031*** 0.028*** 0.022***    
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)    
Health care -0.011*** -0.008** -0.017***    
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Cryptology 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.023***    
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Ordnance 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.030***    
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Communications 
systems 
-0.014** -0.012* -0.021***    
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Weapons system 
and control 
-0.004 -0.002 -0.011**    
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
Entry year 1958 -0.111*** -0.123*** -0.096*** -0.104*** -0.097*** -0.113*** 
 (0.031) (0.020) (0.037) (0.031) (0.036) (0.022) 
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 (0.013) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.008) 
Entry year 1960 -0.092*** -0.111*** -0.077*** -0.084*** -0.077*** -0.100*** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.011) 
Entry year 1961 -0.106*** -0.121*** -0.096*** -0.099*** -0.096*** -0.113*** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) 
Entry year 1962 -0.088*** -0.109*** -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.076*** -0.101*** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) 
Entry year 1963 -0.097*** -0.114*** -0.088*** -0.093*** -0.088*** -0.108*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) 
Entry year 1964 -0.084*** -0.105*** -0.070*** -0.078*** -0.071*** -0.096*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) 
Entry year 1965 -0.084*** -0.105*** -0.071*** -0.079*** -0.072*** -0.096*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) 
Entry year 1966 -0.078*** -0.101*** -0.064*** -0.072*** -0.064*** -0.092*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) 
Entry year 1967 -0.078*** -0.101*** -0.066*** -0.074*** -0.066*** -0.093*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
Entry year 1968 -0.083*** -0.104*** -0.072*** -0.078*** -0.072*** -0.097*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) 
Entry year 1969 -0.069*** -0.095*** -0.058*** -0.065*** -0.059*** -0.089*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) 
Entry year 1970 -0.072*** -0.096*** -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.061*** -0.089*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) 
Entry year 1971 -0.042*** -0.073*** -0.030*** -0.038*** -0.031*** -0.067*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) 
Entry year 1972 -0.051*** -0.080*** -0.042*** -0.049*** -0.042*** -0.075*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
Entry year 1973 -0.023** -0.056*** -0.012 -0.021* -0.013 -0.051*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) 
Entry year 1974 -0.031*** -0.064*** -0.020** -0.027*** -0.020** -0.058*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
Entry year 1975 -0.014 -0.048*** -0.002 -0.011 -0.003 -0.042*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
Entry year 1976 0.008 -0.029*** 0.021** 0.012 0.020** -0.022*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
Entry year 1977 0.033*** -0.006 0.044*** 0.035*** 0.043*** -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
Entry year 1978 0.047*** 0.009 0.057*** 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.013 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
Entry year 1979 0.077*** 0.035*** 0.087*** 0.078*** 0.087*** 0.040*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Entry year 1980 0.112*** 0.070*** 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.120*** 0.073*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Entry year 1981 0.120*** 0.081*** 0.128*** 0.119*** 0.128*** 0.085*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Entry year 1982 0.147*** 0.104*** 0.154*** 0.146*** 0.154*** 0.107*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Entry year 1983 0.126*** 0.093*** 0.131*** 0.123*** 0.130*** 0.093*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Entry year 1984 0.138*** 0.105*** 0.144*** 0.137*** 0.143*** 0.107*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Entry year 1985 0.142*** 0.108*** 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.146*** 0.110*** 
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Entry year 1986 0.132*** 0.105*** 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.136*** 0.106*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Entry year 1987 0.124*** 0.104*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.128*** 0.107*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Entry year 1988 0.114*** 0.102*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.100*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Entry year 1989 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.105*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Entry year 1990 0.100*** 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.089*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Entry year 1991 0.100*** 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.089*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Entry year 1992 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Entry year 1993 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry year 1994 0.003 0.009* -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1995 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry year 1996 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry year 1997 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry year 1998 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.036*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry year 1999 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2000 0.012** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2001 0.008* 0.011** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2002 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.008* 0.010** 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2003 -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2004 -0.029*** -0.035*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Entry year 2005 -0.046*** -0.055*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.049*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Entry year 2006 -0.063*** -0.081*** -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.081*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Entry year 2007 -0.043*** -0.063*** -0.045*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.073*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Entry year 2008 -0.068*** -0.089*** -0.074*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.099*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) 
Entry year 2009 -0.032* -0.052*** -0.038** -0.030* -0.031* -0.054*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) 
Left sample  -0.085***    -0.097*** 
  (0.003)    (0.003) 
 E1–E3 last 
observation 
  0.035***  0.057*** 0.091*** 
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 E4–E6 last 
observation 
  0.043***  0.040*** 0.054*** 
   (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Construction last 
observation 
   0.059*** 0.056*** 0.064*** 




   0.035*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ship maintenance 
last observation 
   0.077*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 




   0.047*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 




   0.105*** 0.103*** 0.108*** 
    (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Health care last 
observation 
   0.049*** 0.048*** 0.057*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Cryptology last 
observation 
   0.102*** 0.101*** 0.110*** 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ordnance last 
observation 
   0.097*** 0.095*** 0.104*** 




   0.005 0.004 0.009 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Weapons system 
and control last 
observation 
   0.054*** 0.052*** 0.060*** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Observations 177186 177186 175567 175567 175567 175567 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX K. UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE OF MARINE CORPS 

















































-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1 deployment 
while married 
0.024*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
2 deployments 
while married 
0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.011 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
3 deployments 
while married 
-0.034 -0.034 -0.030 -0.033 -0.028 -0.029 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.033) (0.033) 
Greater than 3 
deployments 
while married 
0.001 0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.006 0.004 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.065) (0.061) (0.064) (0.062) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
-0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Deployed to Iraq -0.013** -0.014** -0.014** -0.013** -0.014** -0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 





-0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Control Variables 
Female 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Dependent 
quantity 
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Married to 
military spouse 
0.045*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Divorced prior to 
marriage 
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 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Never married 
prior to marriage 
-0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 




0.024 0.025 0.026 0.032 0.034 0.035 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
W01–W05 
when married 
-0.003 -0.003  -0.010   
 (0.017) (0.017)  (0.016)   
O1–O3 when 
married 
0.012 0.018  0.003   
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.018)   
O4–O5 when 
married 
-0.015 -0.014  -0.022   
 (0.016) (0.016)  (0.015)   
Faith -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.019* -0.033*** -0.015 -0.018* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Black 0.026** 0.027** 0.025** 0.027** 0.026** 0.026** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander 
0.200*** 0.202*** 0.182*** 0.200*** 0.183*** 0.186*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) 
Asian -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 




0.019 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.016 0.015 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Combat arms -0.004 -0.004 -0.001    
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)    
Combat support 0.002 0.003 0.005    
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
Combat service 
support 
-0.009 -0.009 -0.006    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    
Aviation -0.012 -0.011 -0.007    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    
Entry year 1961 0.933*** 0.932*** 0.936*** 0.933*** 0.938*** 0.937*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Entry year 1966 0.936*** 0.934*** 0.939*** 0.935*** 0.942*** 0.940*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
Entry year 1967 0.924*** 0.921*** 0.928*** 0.923*** 0.933*** 0.930*** 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.027) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) 
Entry year 1968 0.922*** 0.918*** 0.928*** 0.921*** 0.933*** 0.929*** 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024) 
Entry year 1969 0.933*** 0.931*** 0.937*** 0.933*** 0.940*** 0.938*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) 
Entry year 1970 0.933*** 0.931*** 0.937*** 0.933*** 0.940*** 0.938*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) 
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 (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1972 0.941*** 0.940*** 0.943*** 0.941*** 0.944*** 0.944*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Entry year 1973 0.943*** 0.942*** 0.944*** 0.943*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1974 0.944*** 0.944*** 0.946*** 0.945*** 0.947*** 0.947*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1975 0.945*** 0.944*** 0.947*** 0.945*** 0.948*** 0.947*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1976 0.947*** 0.947*** 0.949*** 0.947*** 0.949*** 0.949*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1977 0.949*** 0.948*** 0.950*** 0.949*** 0.951*** 0.951*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1978 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.951*** 0.950*** 0.952*** 0.952*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1979 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.951*** 0.950*** 0.951*** 0.952*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1980 0.948*** 0.948*** 0.950*** 0.948*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1981 0.952*** 0.952*** 0.953*** 0.952*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1982 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.955*** 0.954*** 0.955*** 0.955*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1983 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.951*** 0.950*** 0.952*** 0.952*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1984 0.951*** 0.951*** 0.952*** 0.951*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Entry year 1985 0.951*** 0.951*** 0.952*** 0.951*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1986 0.956*** 0.956*** 0.957*** 0.956*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1987 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.956*** 0.955*** 0.956*** 0.956*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1988 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.956*** 0.956*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1989 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.954*** 0.953*** 0.955*** 0.955*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1990 0.953*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.955*** 0.955*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1991 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.956*** 0.955*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1992 0.956*** 0.956*** 0.957*** 0.956*** 0.958*** 0.958*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1993 0.956*** 0.956*** 0.956*** 0.956*** 0.957*** 0.958*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1994 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.956*** 0.956*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1995 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.952*** 0.953*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1996 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.953*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.955*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
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 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Entry year 1998 0.952*** 0.952*** 0.951*** 0.953*** 0.952*** 0.952*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 1999 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.948*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Entry year 2000 0.949*** 0.949*** 0.947*** 0.949*** 0.949*** 0.949*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Entry year 2001 0.944*** 0.944*** 0.937*** 0.944*** 0.941*** 0.941*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012) 
Entry year 2002 0.944*** 0.944*** 0.938*** 0.944*** 0.941*** 0.941*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) 
Entry year 2003 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.942*** 0.946*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) 
Entry year 2004 0.941*** 0.941*** 0.934*** 0.941*** 0.937*** 0.937*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.008) (0.016) (0.014) 
Entry year 2005 0.939*** 0.939*** 0.931*** 0.940*** 0.935*** 0.934*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.022) (0.009) (0.018) (0.016) 
Entry year 2006 0.926*** 0.925*** 0.910*** 0.927*** 0.918*** 0.914*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.046) (0.020) (0.037) (0.036) 
Entry year 2009 0.937*** 0.937*** 0.937*** 0.937*** 0.938*** 0.938*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
Left sample  -0.018***    -0.023*** 
  (0.005)    (0.005) 
Combat arms 
last observation 
   0.006 -0.021* -0.022** 
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Combat support 
last observation 
   0.012 -0.017 -0.017 




   -0.002 -0.028*** -0.029*** 
    (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Aviation last 
observation 
   -0.003 -0.027** -0.027** 
    (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
 W01–W05 last 
observation 
  0.035**  0.072*** 0.072*** 
   (0.016)  (0.027) (0.027) 
 O1–O3 last 
observation 
  0.096***  0.129*** 0.141*** 
   (0.015)  (0.024) (0.024) 
 O4–O5 last 
observation 
  0.018*  0.042*** 0.045*** 
   (0.009)  (0.015) (0.015) 
Observations 13111 13111 13104 13104 13104 13104 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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APPENDIX L. UNRESTRICTED SAMPLE OF MARINE CORPS 

















































-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1 deployment 
while married 
0.022*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
2 deployments 
while married 
0.036*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.036*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
3 deployments 
while married 
0.056 0.051 0.058 0.051 0.066 0.060 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.039) 
Greater than 3 
deployments 
while married 
0.104 0.105 0.119 0.102 0.119 0.119 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.108) (0.105) (0.111) (0.111) 
Deployed to 
Afghanistan 
0.013 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Deployed to Iraq 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 





-0.009** -0.012*** -0.009** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Control Variables 
Female 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dependent 
quantity 
-0.015*** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married to 
military spouse 
0.036*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.044*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Divorced prior to 
marriage 
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 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Never married 
prior to marriage 
-0.018*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Widow/Widower 
prior to marriage 
-0.017 -0.018 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) 
E1–E3 when 
married 
0.051*** 0.062***  0.051***   
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009)   
E4–E6 when 
married 
0.021*** 0.031***  0.016**   
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008)   
Faith -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Black 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.007** 0.007** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander 
0.012 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Asian 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 




0.042*** 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Combat arms -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.059***    
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Combat support -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.050***    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Combat service 
support 
-0.054*** -0.052*** -0.049***    
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Aviation -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.041***    
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Entry year 1960 0.918*** 0.919*** 0.922*** 0.922*** 0.922*** 0.923*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1965 0.904*** 0.908*** 0.909*** 0.910*** 0.910*** 0.913*** 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
Entry year 1966 0.905*** 0.908*** 0.909*** 0.910*** 0.910*** 0.911*** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) 
Entry year 1967 0.909*** 0.912*** 0.913*** 0.913*** 0.913*** 0.915*** 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) (0.019) 
Entry year 1968 0.906*** 0.908*** 0.910*** 0.910*** 0.911*** 0.911*** 
 (0.026) (0.001) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) 
Entry year 1969 0.920*** 0.921*** 0.923*** 0.923*** 0.924*** 0.925*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Entry year 1972 0.919*** 0.920*** 0.923*** 0.923*** 0.923*** 0.924*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Entry year 1973 0.923*** 0.924*** 0.927*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.927*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
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 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 1975 0.923*** 0.924*** 0.927*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.927*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1976 0.924*** 0.925*** 0.927*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.928*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entry year 1977 0.924*** 0.925*** 0.927*** 0.926*** 0.927*** 0.928*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 1978 0.925*** 0.925*** 0.928*** 0.927*** 0.928*** 0.929*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1979 0.925*** 0.926*** 0.929*** 0.928*** 0.929*** 0.930*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1980 0.925*** 0.926*** 0.929*** 0.928*** 0.928*** 0.929*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1981 0.926*** 0.927*** 0.930*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 0.930*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1982 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.930*** 0.929*** 0.930*** 0.931*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1983 0.926*** 0.927*** 0.930*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 0.930*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1984 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.930*** 0.929*** 0.930*** 0.931*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1985 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.930*** 0.930*** 0.930*** 0.931*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1986 0.927*** 0.928*** 0.931*** 0.930*** 0.930*** 0.931*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1987 0.927*** 0.928*** 0.931*** 0.930*** 0.930*** 0.932*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1988 0.928*** 0.929*** 0.932*** 0.931*** 0.931*** 0.932*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1989 0.929*** 0.930*** 0.932*** 0.931*** 0.932*** 0.933*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1990 0.929*** 0.930*** 0.933*** 0.932*** 0.932*** 0.933*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1991 0.929*** 0.930*** 0.933*** 0.932*** 0.932*** 0.933*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Entry year 1992 0.933*** 0.934*** 0.936*** 0.935*** 0.935*** 0.937*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Entry year 1993 0.946*** 0.949*** 0.947*** 0.947*** 0.946*** 0.949*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Entry year 1994 0.954*** 0.956*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.956*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Entry year 1995 0.957*** 0.960*** 0.958*** 0.958*** 0.957*** 0.960*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Entry year 1996 0.960*** 0.963*** 0.961*** 0.961*** 0.961*** 0.963*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Entry year 1997 0.961*** 0.964*** 0.963*** 0.962*** 0.962*** 0.964*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Entry year 1998 0.962*** 0.964*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.965*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Entry year 1999 0.962*** 0.964*** 0.964*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.965*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
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 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Entry year 2001 0.965*** 0.968*** 0.967*** 0.967*** 0.967*** 0.969*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Entry year 2002 0.963*** 0.966*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.967*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Entry year 2003 0.959*** 0.962*** 0.962*** 0.961*** 0.962*** 0.964*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2004 0.950*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.955*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Entry year 2005 0.939*** 0.941*** 0.942*** 0.942*** 0.942*** 0.943*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Entry year 2006 0.928*** 0.929*** 0.930*** 0.931*** 0.930*** 0.930*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Entry year 2007 0.927*** 0.928*** 0.930*** 0.930*** 0.930*** 0.930*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Entry year 2008 0.925*** 0.926*** 0.927*** 0.928*** 0.928*** 0.929*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Entry year 2009 0.923*** 0.924*** 0.923*** 0.924*** 0.924*** 0.924*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Left sample  -0.043***    -0.053*** 
  (0.003)    (0.004) 
Combat arms 
last observation 
   -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.051*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Combat support 
last observation 
   -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.042*** 




   -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.038*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Aviation last 
observation 
   -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.032*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
E1–E3 last 
observation 
  0.075***  0.082*** 0.116*** 
   (0.009)  (0.009) (0.010) 
E4–E6 last 
observation 
  0.018***  0.020*** 0.038*** 
   (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 108074 108074 107649 107649 107649 107649 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** 
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